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The Atlantic Philanthropies is by all accounts the largest endowed  
institution in history deliberately to spend itself out of existence.  
The decision was taken in large part because of the desire of Atlantic’s 
founder, Charles F. Feeney, to witness the social benefits of his  
enormous donation—nearly all of his personal fortune—during his 
lifetime. Because of the scale and personal drama of that story,  
the idea of “Giving While Living” has become all but identified with 
Mr. Feeney and the Atlantic Philanthropies, even though a growing  
number of smaller foundations have also embraced the idea in  
recent years.
Yet in an important sense, Mr. Feeney already “gave while living” long 
ago. He irrevocably donated close to a billion dollars to Atlantic while 
still in his 50s, creating one of the world’s largest and most respected 
foundations and devoting the major part of his later career to philan-
thropy. As his model, Andrew Carnegie, pointed out in a 19th century 
essay that profoundly influenced Mr. Feeney, many wealthy people 
wait until their death to part with so great a percentage of their assets. 
“Men who leave vast sums in this way,” Carnegie wryly observed, “may 
fairly be thought men who would not have left it at all, had they been 
able to take it with them.” Instead, Atlantic’s fortune was a gift from 
not only a living donor, but also a relatively young one whose life and 
wealth were permanently changed by the gift. So by any literal stan-
dard, Mr. Feeney’s seminal act of “giving” was complete nearly two 
decades in the past.
For Chuck Feeney and Atlantic, therefore, the remarkable experiment 
in charitable liquidation has been not only a case of “giving while 
living,” but something more—something that might (less melodi-
ously) be called “making a major difference while living” or “conduct-
ing an all-out offensive on social problems while living.” Even more 
than its donor’s near-total generosity, it is the scale and immediacy 
of Atlantic’s grants, the size and brevity of its ambitions, that make 
its approaching sunset such an unusual and important undertaking. 
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Atlantic’s story, however it turns out, will inevitably be a closely 
observed experiment in how philanthropy can be conducted and 
what a foundation can achieve when it pursues great ends on a brief 
calendar.
Yet the decision to spend down such a great fortune in such a short 
time, remarkable as that is, was just the first act in a much longer 
drama that is only now playing out. All of the questions that followed 
that seminal decision—spend how? spend on what? organize how? 
evaluate what?—present new layers of complexity and an assortment 
of fine-grained operational challenges that are uncommon, or at least 
take very different forms, in foundations that operate in perpetuity. 
How Atlantic confronts and resolves those questions is the subject of 
a series of reports that begins with this submission.
Most of the information presented here is drawn from dozens of in-
terviews with Atlantic Trustees, staff, and grantees, all of which were 
conducted with a guarantee of anonymity to encourage candor. A 
considerable archive of minutes, memoranda, policy statements, and 
strategy papers, as well as a published biography of Mr. Feeney, also 
provides background and detail for this story. The facts asserted here 
are therefore taken, as faithfully as possible, from the written record 
and the firsthand recollections and observations of participants in 
the story. However, the inferences, judgments, and conclusions that 
we draw from these facts are solely those of the authors. Except when 
directly attributed or quoted, opinions expressed in this paper are not 
necessarily those of anyone at Atlantic or any of its grantees.
In this first report, we chronicle the eight years following Atlantic’s 
decision to give away its whole endowment in two decades or less. 
Later installments will update the story year-by-year. In truth, this first 
period was not one in which the institution was much preoccupied 
with the idea of spending down and ending its work. On the contrary, 
with the end-date still blurry and remote, a decade or more away, 
most decisions had to do with the fundamental challenge facing any 
philanthropy, regardless of its lifespan. In this case, of course, the 
challenge was made all the more urgent by the scale of what Atlantic 
was trying to do, but it was one that any major foundation has to con-
front periodically: to design large, strategically smart programs that 
would be likely to achieve, in the words of one early statement, “a leg-
acy . . . worthy of the generosity which brought us into existence.”
Still, managing a foundation that will not exist when the next decade 
is finished—husbanding its financial resources to suit the wind-
down, operating grant programs that will end responsibly, keeping 
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and motivating a staff whose jobs aren’t indefinite—poses unique 
challenges and risks, even in these early years. This series of reports 
will describe how Atlantic’s Board and staff deal with those realities, 
and how they guide their institution to a conclusion that demon-
strates the possibilities of “Giving While Living”—not just as a means 
of distributing great wealth, but as a way of achieving great ends.
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On March 1, 1982, with an initial gift of $5 million, Charles F. Feeney 
created what was then called the Atlantic Foundation. Some two and 
a half years later, he transferred to the foundation virtually all of his 
personal fortune, consisting mostly of shares in the international re-
tail enterprise Duty Free Shoppers (DFS), which he had co-founded 
two decades earlier. Because shares in the company had never been 
publicly traded, the value of this donation could not be established 
precisely at the time, but estimates ranged between $500 million and 
$1 billion.1 When the shares were liquidated roughly a dozen years 
later, the foundation’s endowment, which also included other invest-
ments and business ventures, was worth at least $3.5 billion. Attorney 
Harvey Dale, who oversaw the various transactions and served as the 
foundation’s first CEO, described Mr. Feeney’s massive surrender of 
personal wealth as “probably unique in the history of the world.”
The donation was inspired, in part, by the writing of an American 
philanthropic pioneer, Andrew Carnegie. In the 1889 essay, “Wealth,” 
which Mr. Feeney circulated to virtually everyone associated with the 
creation of the Atlantic Foundation, Carnegie wrote: 
[L]eaving wealth at death for public uses . . . is only a means for the 
disposal of wealth, provided a man is content to wait until he is 
dead before it becomes of much good in the world. Knowledge of 
the results of legacies bequeathed is not calculated to inspire the 
brightest hopes of much posthumous good being accomplished. 
The cases are not few in which the real object sought by the testa-
tor is not attained, nor are they few in which his real wishes are 
thwarted. In many cases the bequests are so used as to become 
only monuments of his folly. 
1. This and many other assertions about the early years of Mr. Feeney’s and Atlantic’s 
philanthropy are drawn from Conor O’Clery, The Billionaire Who Wasn’t: How Chuck Feeney 
Made and Gave Away a Fortune Without Anyone Knowing, New York: Public Affairs, 2007. 
1 .
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Carnegie’s essay and other influences seem to have suggested to Mr. 
Feeney, from the very beginning of his philanthropic career, that the 
best use of the charitable fortune he had created would be to distrib-
ute the money during his life. Although he did not say so explicitly 
for many years, at least one longtime friend and foundation Trustee2 
feels no doubt that “Chuck Feeney always intended to give all the 
money away in his lifetime. That was perfectly obvious to me from 
the beginning. Even if he hadn’t figured out quite what that would 
mean, at first, there was clearly no way the foundation was going to 
go on forever.”
Even so, Mr. Feeney’s early intentions about whether the foundation 
should have a limited life or survive in perpetuity were, like many of 
his views and beliefs, left largely unstated. Author Conor O’Clery, in 
his 2006 biography, The Billionaire Who Wasn’t, noted a lifelong reti-
cence in Mr. Feeney’s personality, describing it this way: “Although 
brilliant when talking about business, Feeney was never good at artic-
ulating his philosophy of life. . . . Instead of explaining what was going 
on in his mind, he would give friends and family members articles or 
cuttings from magazines or newspapers. They had to infer the mes-
sage.” The Carnegie essay, Mr. O’Clery surmises, was just such an arti-
cle, intended to reveal to foundation Trustees an otherwise unspoken 
philosophy that came to be known as Giving While Living.
In private conversation with friends and advisers, the subject of lim-
ited-term philanthropy came up often, but Mr. Feeney seemed in no 
hurry to set it in stone. Fifteen years after the foundation was created, 
when the Board began distributing the enormous proceeds of the DFS 
sale, there were still no rules on how much should be given away each 
year or for how long. Harvey Dale reminded the members in a confi-
dential 1997 memo that the grants need not be limited to amounts 
that would keep the endowment intact. “We are not confined by any 
requirement,” he wrote, that the foundation last forever. He added, 
to no one’s apparent surprise, that the total annual grants he and Mr. 
Feeney recommended to the Board would sometimes exceed the level 
at which the foundation could be self-perpetuating. 
Nonetheless, the first official statement that this was actually Mr. 
Feeney’s preference did not come for another two years after that 
memo. In 1999, at a Board meeting at the Cornell Club in New York, 
Mr. Feeney read a short, prepared statement noting that the foun-
dation’s total donations would be close to $400 million that year, a 
2. To encourage candor, interviews for this report were conducted anonymously. On rare 
occasion, with a source’s consent, a quote may be attributed to someone by name, but only 
when the identity of the speaker is essential to the significance of the quote.
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level that, if sustained, would use up the endowment and all earnings 
within two or three decades. He then proposed that annual outlays 
be increased to $450 million and that the Board consider setting the 
foundation’s life expectancy at 20 to 30 years.
Seeing no need to foreclose its options at that point, the Board react-
ed favorably to Mr. Feeney’s statement but took no formal action, nor 
did the founder ask for one. As at least one Trustee remembers it, “We 
really didn’t see any need for a formal decision. We knew what Chuck 
wanted to do, and there was such reverence for him around that table 
that there was no way anyone was going to oppose it. On the contrary, 
there were a number of us on the Board who had concerns about the 
idea of foundations [operating] in perpetuity. But to some extent, the 
question was academic. If we kept on making grants at the rate we 
were making them, the spend-down was going to happen anyway. As a 
financial matter, a formal resolution was almost beside the point.”
WHY SPEND DOWN?
The Trustees’ “concerns about the idea of perpetuity” fell into roughly 
four categories, depending on the particular member and the issue 
under discussion at any given time. First was the risk, discussed at 
length in Andrew Carnegie’s essay, that future leaders would even-
tually dilute or distort the institution’s founding mission. This may 
have been an even greater concern for those closest to Mr. Feeney, 
given that he had not been inclined toward precise articulations of 
purpose and principle. In organizing the original Board and staff, and 
in later expansions of both, Mr. Feeney and Mr. Dale tended to select 
people who not only brought deep expertise in philanthropy and con-
cern for the public interest but were also close to Mr. Feeney in world-
view and temperament (though not necessarily personal friends). As 
he did in business, Atlantic’s founder has preferred to pick people 
he trusts to run his philanthropy, and then leave them broad latitude 
for decision-making. But with the passing of time, there would be no 
reason to believe that future Boards would be similarly constituted, or 
that their choices and predilections would be compatible with those 
of the founder and the original Trustees. 
A second belief about perpetual foundations, widely held at Atlantic, 
is that they can become, to use Harvey Dale’s term, “sclerotic”3—
 
3. David Bank, “Some Foundations are Electing to Spend It All Now, Close Shop,” The Wall Street 
Journal, Sept. 10, 2002, p. 1-C.
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strategically hidebound, slow to change, and overly preoccupied with 
their traditions, image, and stature. Without the discipline of having 
to raise money or account to any authority, and without the prodding 
of a living donor, it would not be hard for a perpetual foundation to 
settle into lethargy or mediocrity—a point also raised by Carnegie. 
While it is not hard to name longstanding foundations of which none 
of these things is true4, several Trustees readily cited institutions that 
they considered prime examples of their worst fears. And they were 
determined that Atlantic would not go down that path.
A third concern about perpetuity was largely personal, both to the 
founder and to some of the original staff and Trustees. As several ear-
ly participants pointed out, donating money and accomplishing good 
work is invigorating and fulfilling in a way that establishing a perpet-
ual endowment is not. For an entrepreneur like Mr. Feeney, a key sat-
isfaction of making any investment had always been the pleasure of 
seeing what it accomplishes. The point of his massive donation was 
partly to experience the joy of giving, not just its solemn obligations. 
“If you want to give it away,” he said to Conor O’Clery many years lat-
er, “think about giving it away while you are alive, because you’ll get a 
lot more satisfaction than if you wait until you’re dead. Besides, it’s  
a lot more fun.” 
‘DOING SOMETHING BIG, RIGHT NOW’
Finally, and most strategically, keeping a foundation alive in perpe-
tuity requires holding grants to a much lower annual sum, in most 
years, than is possible if the endowment is allowed to decline to 
zero. Most perpetual foundations target their annual expenditures 
at the legal minimum, around 5 percent of their endowment’s value, 
averaged over the previous three years. Though Atlantic’s total giv-
ing fluctuated widely throughout its first 15 years, tracking similar 
fluctuations in its resources, by the end of the 1990s outlays were 
hitting 10 percent of the endowment and sometimes went higher. 
The reason was that Mr. Feeney, Mr. Dale, the staff, and Trustees saw 
large, dramatic philanthropic opportunities and opted to seize them, 
without much concern about whether the annual totals would lead to 
perpetuity or not. Commitments to expanding research institutions 
in Ireland, building health centers in Vietnam, strengthening civil so-
ciety and human rights organizations in the United States (to name a 
few big-ticket endeavors) all placed outsize claims on the portfolio in 
4. Including, arguably, Carnegie’s own charities, which operate (ironically, some might say) as 
perpetual institutions.
WINDING DOWN
THE ATLANTIC 
PHILANTHROPIES
THE FIRST 
EIGHT YEARS: 
2001–2008
PRINCIPLE
8
the early years. But all of them, in different ways, represented historic 
opportunities to make a significant, lasting change in the way some 
aspect of human well-being was pursued and sustained. In short, a 
culture of “big bets” has prevailed at the foundation from its earliest 
years, largely as an outgrowth of Mr. Feeney’s expansive philanthropic 
ambition and his history as a builder of huge new enterprises. 
Yet although the language of “big bets” has gained considerable cur-
rency in and around the institution—the phrase is widely used by 
staff, Trustees, and some grantees—the decision to spend down was 
based not solely on the ability to make large grants. It had even more 
to do with the ability to make a critical difference now, creating social 
forces whose benefit to humankind, over time, would exceed even the 
best financial return on an endowment left perpetually in the hands 
of investment managers.
As one staff member put it, “If you’re able to put money into the 
ground on projects that generate a social return, and that compounds 
at a higher rate than your financial assets would—in theory, that’s the 
argument for spend-down. In theory, if you give all your assets now to 
a project that is going to create amazing social returns that will then 
compound rapidly, you’re going to do more good than if you just took 
your assets, held them for 100 years, generated a massive financial re-
turn, and then gave them away at the end.”
A Trustee put the thought more succinctly: “You’re much more likely 
to make a difference by doing something big right now than by drib-
bling the money out to the end of time.” 
Though deeply held throughout the foundation, this principle is as 
much a matter of aspiration as of demonstrable fact. There is no 
guarantee, of course, that the foundation’s philanthropic “bets” will 
necessarily result in more social value than could have been achieved 
over longer periods. As another Trustee acknowledged, “No one has 
ever been able to show, with evidence, that a big grant today is worth 
more than five smaller grants in the future. Obviously, it all depends 
on what the grant is for, what difference it makes now, and what 
changes it leads to later. There’s no magic about spending down that 
assures you a better result than you could get otherwise. But spend-
ing down, at the scale and pace that we’re doing it, on the issues we’re 
focusing on, gives us an opportunity to do greater things than could 
be done in dribs and drabs over an indefinite future. It gives us some-
thing to strive for that would have been largely foreclosed if we were 
going to operate in perpetuity. Whatever you may think of perpetu-
ity, it doesn’t give you the option of putting a huge percentage of your 
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chips on something you think is ripe right now. At Atlantic, we can do 
that. Whether we do it wisely or not—well, that’s a separate question.”
THINKING ABOUT THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF SPEND-DOWN
The decision to limit the foundation’s life triggered, in turn, many 
other decisions over the next eight years that will be the subject of the 
rest of this report. The first and most obvious was “how long a life?”—
a question that would depend in large part on how much the Trustees 
chose to spend each year and how long the endowment could sup-
port that level of spending. Mr. Feeney’s 1999 prediction that the en-
dowment could survive 20 to 30 years with outlays of $450 million a 
year proved to be optimistic, especially given the harsh effects on the 
portfolio of the recession that hit a year later. So how long should the 
foundation survive, and at what level of annual donations?
Answering those questions called for detailed analysis and frank dis-
cussion, neither of which had yet taken place in 1999. Meanwhile, 
the high level of annual grant commitments continued, and in fact 
was rising. In late 2001, when John R. Healy succeeded Harvey Dale as 
the foundation’s CEO, he quickly saw that the quiet, often unspoken 
understandings that had long characterized the foundation’s gover-
nance—including the never-formalized decision to spend down—
were going to have a profound effect on his budget and management 
of the organization. But he wasn’t sure exactly what that effect was 
supposed to be. 
Although he had served for years as senior vice-president, oversee-
ing Atlantic’s activity outside the United States, the new CEO had not 
been intimately involved, as Mr. Dale had, in the financial manage-
ment of the organization. It was only when he stepped into the top job 
that he began to reckon fully with the effect that the enormous annual 
outlays would eventually have on Atlantic’s finances, program, and 
personnel. It was time, he felt, to raise these questions explicitly and 
begin making longer-term plans to answer them.
“I went to the Board and said, ‘Look, it seems to me as if we are spend-
ing this foundation down,” Mr. Healy recalls. “That’s what the figures 
tell me. But we’ve never taken a decision to spend it down. I think we 
should address this issue and decide: are we here for the long term, 
or are we not?’ ” The need for a decision was more than a formality, 
he explained. “If you are pursuing a policy of committing your re-
sources which will have the inevitable end effect of running down the 
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foundation, but you don’t make an explicit decision to run down 
the foundation, you are storing up a whole heap of trouble for your-
self—trouble in terms of the staff, who are not stupid and can do the 
maths and will be able to see they won’t have jobs—and trouble in 
terms of your grantees, to whom you always owe honesty and clarity. I 
just felt that this was a big gray area.” 
In Mr. Healy’s view, the prospect of a limited life not only meant that 
staff would have to make future career plans, and grantees would have 
to prepare for the end of Atlantic support, but that grantmaking would 
need to become more focused, with a clearer sense of what the institu-
tion wanted to accomplish by the time it shut its doors. He felt that the 
program would need to concentrate in fewer areas of activity, in which 
it could plan for significant achievements in a set number of years. 
The methodical quality of this approach was a marked departure 
from the more enterprising style of Mr. Dale and Mr. Feeney, who 
both preferred to keep options open and not set predetermined lim-
its on their activity. (Once asked about his approach to planning, Mr. 
Feeney is said to have answered, “In my experience, one good oppor-
tunity leads to another.” His philanthropy had largely followed that 
maxim for close to 20 years, and in many respects it still does.) Nor 
did all Trustees at the time share Mr. Healy’s belief that narrowing the 
foundation’s program interests was a necessary aspect of spending 
down wisely. “The evidence we can look at,” one Trustee said, “would 
persuade me that at least sometimes you have tremendous impact 
with relatively small amounts given in a lucky or judicious manner in 
areas where you hadn’t originally planned to invest. It can’t be proved 
that by focusing on a small number of things you get more impact 
than with a more open-ended program.” All the same, the Board was 
persuaded by the end of 2001 that the time had come for more explic-
it planning and decision-making to hone the program and determine 
the course of the spend-down. 
So at the end of January 2002, the Trustees gathered for a strategic 
planning workshop to determine, among other things, the fields in 
which the foundation’s program would concentrate for the remaining 
years of its life. They chose six possible fields of activity for explora-
tion and, over the course of the year, eventually winnowed the list to 
four: Disadvantaged Children and Youth, Aging, Population Health, 
and Reconciliation and Human Rights. How the work in these four 
areas would play out over the foundation’s remaining years, and how 
the scope of work could be tailored to suit a limited lifespan, would be 
decided in a more detailed planning exercise, conducted by staff and 
consultants, that continued for roughly 18 months more. 
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RUNNING THE NUMBERS, 
SETTING A DATE
The retreat took place in an atmosphere of plenty—the portfolio had 
grown by close to $1 billion in just the past two or three years—but 
that was soon to be altered by the recession of 2000-2003. Yet even be-
fore the recession took its toll, Trustees began to see that their hopes 
for longevity and annual giving would have to be scaled back. Based 
on projections from David Erskine, the chief investment officer, the 
Board felt it could set only a 15- to 18-year lifetime for the institution, 
with total outlays averaging $400 million a year, running to 2016 or 
slightly later. That was both a shorter life and a lower yearly payout 
than Mr. Feeney had hoped for when he outlined the idea a couple of 
years earlier. 
It would not be long before the full effect of the recession would cause 
Trustees to trim the targeted annual payout even more, at least tem-
porarily, to $350 million. Still, even if the numbers were more limit-
ing than some had imagined, Board members expressed satisfaction, 
and in some cases relief, at having at last come to grips with the basic 
arithmetic of spend-down, setting a tentative timetable, and begin-
ning to envision what the founder’s remarkable act of philanthropy 
would accomplish before it concluded. (And yet, as Mr. Healy was 
quick to point out, they did all this “with no formal resolution.”)
Aggregate spending over Atlantic’s remaining years, assuming a mod-
est return of 5.6 percent on the portfolio, was estimated to approach 
$7.5 billion.
PORTFOLIO, PROGRAM, PERSONNEL
With the retreat concluded, a raft of finer-grained questions now 
awaited analysis and decisions—among them how to manage fi-
nances for a 15- to 18-year spend-down, how to prepare grantees for 
Atlantic’s departure, how to ensure lasting effects from the remaining 
years of philanthropy, and how to retain necessary expertise on staff 
until the end. The next three sections review these questions and how 
Atlantic has addressed, and periodically revisited, them over seven 
years following the 2002 retreat. The structure of these next sections 
of the report borrows from an observation by Harvey Dale that “AP 
comprises assets, programs, and people.” The next three sections ac-
cordingly deal one-by-one with these three primary elements. A fourth 
section considers how the three component parts interact with one 
another in planning and managing the overall conclusion of the foun-
dation’s work. 
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Once the Board had finalized the decision to spend down, John R. 
Healy recalls, “we very quickly realized that we had to do something 
that nobody had thought of prior to the decision’s being made: that 
is, we had to completely change our investment policy, our asset-allo-
cation policy. Because once we were within a defined, or reasonably 
clearly defined, timeline, it was much more important for us than it 
would be for a long-term foundation to be assured of the availability 
of money. We had to therefore take a certain amount of risk out of the 
investment portfolio in order to have that assurance of stability.”
In the grantmaking program that Mr. Healy imagined, and the Board 
generally supported, financial stability was crucial. After an initial 
period when the new program areas would be planned and launched, 
the total budget was expected to build, over two or three years, to the 
target level of $400 million a year and then to stay reasonably steady 
for 10 years through the end of 2016. There would then be a few 
more years to make final payments and wind down. What came to be 
known as the “steady-state” model was later diagrammed this way: 
2002 
Varies by 
Function 
Varies by 
Function 
ca.  
2017 
ca.  
2020 
Spend-Down Life Cycle 
Closure 
2.
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MANAGING INVESTMENTS 
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To provide for this kind of stability over a limited lifespan, the port-
folio could no longer be managed the way it would be at a perpetual 
institution. With an unlimited time horizon, a perpetual foundation 
can invest a significant portion of its resources, often 60 percent or 
more, in longer-term and riskier assets, knowing that, in any given 
year, it will only need to pay out 5 percent or so of its endowment. In 
a bad year, when the portfolio suffers market losses, the grants bud-
get might have to be tightened a bit; but any shortfall can be made 
up with larger grants later. There is always time and opportunity to 
make back the losses and increase payouts when conditions improve. 
Eventually, higher risks and limited liquidity usually lead to higher 
returns, so the perpetual foundation’s strategy maximizes value in the 
long run. But it also severely limits the foundation’s ability to come 
up with exceptionally large amounts of cash in the near term, and can 
lead to significant shorter-term volatility. 
That, in essence, is what Atlantic’s investment portfolio looked like 
in the years leading up to the Board’s decision to liquidate the foun-
dation gradually. At that point, the endowment was still heavy with 
equities—a form of investment that promises healthy returns over 
many years but can suffer severe short-term losses. The foundation’s 
investments were mostly in the hands of what one observer called 
“long-term traditional managers,” experts who might have performed 
the same service for any number of other large foundations, as many 
in fact did. Atlantic’s market exposure was therefore high, and as if to 
demonstrate the risks that such exposure entailed, the bear market of 
2000 to 2003 took a severe bite out of the endowment’s value just as 
the Board was deciding on the future of the institution.
In most foundations, losses like those of 2000-2003 would normally 
have been only a blip, a temporary concern, that would correct itself 
over the long run. For a spend-down institution, by contrast, there 
isn’t much of a long run to make up for short-term losses. In fact, with 
the liquidation clock now officially ticking, the “run” stretched out 
not much farther than 15 years and would become steadily shorter 
year by year. Each year, a shrinking portfolio would have to provide a 
large, steady, and reliable amount of cash, with fewer and fewer years 
in the future when lost value could be recouped. Illiquid investments 
in Atlantic’s portfolio—which even today includes a number of busi-
ness and real estate holdings—would have to be unwound responsi-
bly, before the value of these assets would be needed in the form of 
cash to fund grant commitments. 
Put simply, Atlantic’s investment managers faced two related de-
mands that are far less worrisome to their colleagues at perpetual 
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foundations: the need to limit volatility (i.e., avoid the risk of sudden 
drops in asset values) and to ensure liquidity (remain able to convert 
assets to cash when needed). 
The simplest, surest way to meet both requirements would be to in-
vest like a savvy pensioner: place most or all of the portfolio in index-
linked bonds whose maturities are matched to expected annual pay-
outs. But that would produce considerably less return than any of the 
budget forecasts had projected. Real yields on 10-year index-linked 
bonds are around 2 percent, and lower for shorter maturities; the ex-
pected real return on the Atlantic portfolio is close to 6 percent. This 
approach would mean that Atlantic would have to donate less money 
each year, shut its doors earlier, or perhaps both. 
In a 2008 article, Philip Coates, who succeeded David Erskine as the 
foundation’s Chief Investment Officer, explained the solution that he 
and Mr. Erskine had proposed, and that the management and Board 
approved in 2003:
Atlantic’s approach has . . . been to structure a portfolio which 
seeks to generate attractive returns over its limited life, but also 
seeks to protect capital better than a typical long-term institution-
al portfolio during periods of market stress. . . . Atlantic also seeks 
to have an asymmetric expected risk/return profile—i.e., for the 
expected upside volatility to be higher than the expected downside 
volatility. This is achieved in practice by investing heavily in abso-
lute-return investment managers: both hedge funds and private 
equity (the latter for only as long as the remaining time frame is 
long enough to allow full investment and liquidation).5
The virtue of this approach, some Trustees and staff members sug-
gest, was demonstrated in the run-up to the recession and financial 
crisis of 2008. Toward the end of 2006, the Investment Committee 
approved a recommendation from Mr. Coates to liquidate all the 
foundation’s remaining market-related assets, a mixture of global 
equities, bonds, and commodities, which were worth close to three-
quarters of a billion dollars. Combined with the significant cash that 
the portfolio already contained, the sale made for a far more conser-
vative asset mix than would have been normal at a traditional founda-
tion. Some observers questioned the sale at the time, suggesting that 
it was too soon to withdraw entirely from a market that was still rising 
steeply. But just two years later, with the market in free-fall, the deci-
sion seemed much more prudent: it resulted in Atlantic’s endowment 
5. Philip Coates, “Structuring the Investment Portfolio of a Limited Life Foundation,” in Effect, a 
magazine published by the European Foundation Center, Winter 2008, p. 29.
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suffering much smaller losses than were typical at most other foun-
dations. At Atlantic, the peak-to-trough loss during the 2007-2009 fi-
nancial crisis was 16 percent; many similar institutions suffered twice 
that, and some more.
AN ‘EXOGENOUS’ ALTERNATIVE
The reliance on hedge funds and other actively managed investments 
has remained the essence of Atlantic’s portfolio management since 
the Board endorsed it in 2003. It has enjoyed broad support on the 
Board and its Investment Committee ever since. However, at least one 
Trustee, Harvey Dale, has questioned the presumption that the entire 
portfolio needs to be managed for eventual liquidation. Would it not 
be better, he has asked, to accept less liquidity and greater volatility, 
in the interest of earning a higher return and amassing greater chari-
table resources? True, that would mean that some non-cash assets 
would remain in the portfolio at the end of Atlantic’s life, presumably 
because they were not or could not be sold earlier. But these could 
then be transferred as charitable resources to some other organiza-
tion—perhaps a grantee or a public-interest institution willing and 
able to manage them according to Atlantic’s instructions.
In Mr. Dale’s view, the foundation would open a world of possibilities 
if it began to think of itself “exogenously”—that is, as a collection of 
resources, talents, and ideas that will live on in the world long after 
Atlantic has closed its doors. The “exogenous” view, he wrote in 2007, 
might suggest that the relevant investing horizon is not necessarily 
ten years [or less], but rather might be longer because of the ability 
to hand off more volatile, less liquid assets to others. . . . If markets 
are favorable in the near term, this sort of strategy would provide 
more assets to spend or disburse for charitable purposes. If mar-
kets are unfavorable in the near term, we could plan to hand off (or 
sell) the more volatile, less liquid portions of our portfolio to other 
foundations, grantees, or investors who, by holding and manag-
ing them over a longer time horizon, would be able to realize the 
higher total returns that should flow from them.6
The exogenous approach would have other consequences, too, touch-
ing on program strategy and human resources, which Mr. Dale con-
siders even more significant than the financial implications. Some of 
6. Harvey Dale, “Re: Exogenous AP,” an undated memorandum to the Atlantic Philanthropies 
Investment Committee, presented at the meeting on 20 September 2007, p. 1.
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these will surface under later headings in this report. But as a matter 
of investment strategy, his proposal has thus far encountered skepti-
cism among fellow Trustees and Atlantic management. Although no 
action has been taken on his ideas at the time this is written, some 
Board members have expressed unease at the prospect of Atlantic as-
sets being preserved intact beyond the end date, an idea one Trustee 
described as “shadow perpetuity—just extending the life of the funds 
indefinitely beyond the life of Atlantic.” 
Several others, both on the Board and on staff, note that a donation 
of relatively illiquid assets would be feasible only if the recipients are 
large institutions with sophisticated financial management experi-
enced in handling these kinds of assets. As one person summed it 
up: “If you hold onto these [illiquid investments], as your remaining 
timeframe shortens, you might hit a point where you don’t have any 
liquid assets to pay grants. And so then the question becomes, do you 
give grantees bits of the illiquid assets? . . . If you’ve got large grantees, 
like Cornell University, it may well be that they can take these assets. 
But . . . my guess is the vast majority of our grantees would not be able 
to handle them.”
The idea might pose hidden costs as well, said one Investment 
Committee member: “For example, what if we were to say to another 
foundation involved in aging, ‘We’ve got big chunks of private equity 
assets, and we are prepared to make those over to you. And in return 
you would in some way underwrite the program areas that Atlantic 
has committed to, and maybe some of the grants, and maybe absorb 
some of the staff.’ Seems reasonable enough. But it’s going to be 
more complicated than it might appear: Are there going to be legal 
obligations? What happens if in the last few years the more risky as-
sets decline more than you expected in value? Would another organi-
zation be picking up the grantmaking slack? There’s a lot of detail in 
this, and that means a lot of time for a whole range of management, 
and maybe legal staff. And maybe a lot of cost to resolve it all.” 
As of the time this is written, the idea has arisen several times at meet-
ings of the Board’s Investment Committee, but with no formal reso-
lution. In the meantime, the portfolio has continued to be managed 
with the expectation of providing liquidity straight through to the end 
of Atlantic’s intended life. In late 2009, the committee also decided 
that no additional investments would be made in the endowment’s 
most illiquid asset: shares in General Atlantic, a global growth equity 
firm that was originally created by Mr. Feeney specifically to manage 
the foundation’s capital, but that now provides investment services 
worldwide. General Atlantic’s portfolio is designed to maximize 
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long-term return but is not aimed at the kind of shorter-term liquidity 
that Atlantic’s investment plan calls for.
PLANS VS. REALITY
From the beginning, Mr. Healy and the Board acknowledged that the 
elegance of the steady-state plan was too tidy to serve as a literal for-
mula for grantmaking. If nothing else, the 2001 recession made it im-
mediately clear that real-world events would sometimes disrupt the 
smooth simplicity of the model. Even so, they believed that it served 
as a useful planning tool, as well as a helpful discipline, to keep ex-
penditures on track until the end. Without such discipline, several 
Trustees said, it would be difficult or impossible to forecast a reliable 
end date, plan long-term relationships with grantees, and pursue 
philanthropic objectives that might take several years of steady grant-
making to achieve.
The relative predictability of the steady-state model had advantages 
for investment management as well, as one member of the Board’s 
Investment Committee explained: “When we were designing the 
spend-down and the investment strategy, . . . we were always talking 
about spend-down as plus or minus 50, maybe 100, million dollars a 
year. You can’t manage it with a greater degree of certainty than that, 
when you’re operating at our scale. You may want the flexibility to 
seize opportunities available to you in grantmaking. But it was felt to 
be essential to have some view of what the expenditures were going to 
be year by year, and how you’d meet those with the investment portfo-
lio. It would be much harder to manage the portfolio responsibly if we 
couldn’t rely on a reasonably steady level of payments year-on-year.”
But Atlantic had never been the kind of institution that adhered duti-
fully to plans and disciplines. Mr. Feeney, among others, was predis-
posed to seize opportunities when they appear—even (or especially) 
if they are big opportunities that demand large-scale investment in 
exchange for the promise of dramatic social benefits. Almost as soon 
as the model and timeline were adopted, annual grant commitments 
began exceeding the prescribed totals. For a time, as the 2001 reces-
sion ended and the portfolio resumed its steady growth, the high level 
of proposed spending drew some expressions of concern from the 
Board, but not much alarm. 
By 2005, however, alarms were beginning to sound. A number of ex-
ceptional grants had driven commitments well above the approved 
target, and by midyear, senior managers and Trustees were asking the 
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foundation’s investment staff to assess what effect this level of com-
mitments would have. At the Board meeting in September 2005, Philip 
Coates and John R. Healy presented an analysis, previously reviewed 
by the Investment Committee, showing that the current commit-
ments, though unplanned-for, “can be handled without undue risk” 
because of the strong performance of the endowment portfolio in re-
cent years. However, “further unbudgeted commitments,” they report-
ed, “put at risk our ability to achieve the agreed-upon goals in the four 
programmes, to manage grantee relationships smoothly, [and] to exit 
responsibly from the programmes.” By this time, Mr. Healy and the 
investment staff were basing their projections on an 11-year horizon, 
with $300 million in grant commitments in 2006, and $350 million 
a year thereafter, throughout the ten-year “steady state,” until 2016. 
That plan, Mr. Coates and Mr. Healy concluded, would be “consistent 
with the size of our endowment and our expected investment returns.”
But as the presentation continued, Mr. Coates and Mr. Healy then 
asked: “What room is there for additional unbudgeted grants?” The 
succinct answer, printed in italicized capital letters on a presentation 
slide: “NOT MUCH.”
To demonstrate the point, they presented a scenario analysis show-
ing what would happen if the portfolio were to earn “normal,” “lack-
luster,” or “bad” investment returns. “Normal” was defined as 6.5 
percent real returns each year, consistent with the endowment’s past 
performance. “Lackluster” was defined as 0 percent earned for the 
rest of 2005 and for 2006 and then a resumption of normal returns; 
“bad” was defined as zero earnings the first year and a 10 percent loss 
in the next, with normal returns resuming after that. Under each of 
these scenarios, they then presented the effects of either (a) staying 
within the approved “steady-state” grants budget—with and without 
the over-budget commitments already made—or (b) continuing to ex-
ceed the budget by $20 million a year for the next four years. 
With normal or lackluster returns, the portfolio could support the 
current budget (even with the recent over-commitments) as planned, 
all the way to the end of 2016. A bad performance would shorten that 
plan by a year. If the budget were to be exceeded by $20 million a 
year for the next four years, however, only a normal-or-better portfo-
lio performance would keep the steady state going through 2016. A 
lackluster or bad market would shorten the plan by one or two years, 
respectively. They emphasized that a dollar lost today, whether from a 
market downturn or increased spending, does more harm to the plan 
than a dollar lost four years from now, because that dollar will no lon-
ger be earning returns to feed future commitments. 
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In short, if the institution were to proceed on its planned path, annual 
grant commitments would quickly need to fall within or close to the 
yearly targets. “Programmes need some certainty about their life and 
investment levels, if we are to achieve desired impact,” Mr. Coates’s 
and Mr. Healy’s last presentation slide concluded. “If investment re-
turns decline sharply, all bets are off!”
Several Board members spoke up to endorse the presentation and its 
recommendations, predicting (in the words of one Trustee) “drastic 
and unwelcome consequences” if the foundation were to have to re-
duce its life expectancy or severely curtail its annual donations. 
Balancing these considerations, however, was a countervailing con-
cern that the foundation might fail to meet its annual spending tar-
gets in future years. As it happens, total grants committed for 2004 
were below that year’s target of $200 million, though it turned out to 
be the last year in which that would be true. At two Board meetings 
in 2005, Mr. Feeney noted that it would not be easy to distribute $350 
million a year with confidence that the money would achieve a sig-
nificant effect. Seizing immediate opportunities of great scale, on the 
other hand, might offer a better chance of achieving great ends, even 
if doing so would limit or disrupt some longer-term plans. In his view, 
spending too quickly and boldly would be a lesser evil than spending 
too slowly or too timidly. Without resolving the issue in any formal 
way, the Board concluded, after Mr. Coates’s and Mr. Healy’s presen-
tation, that it would like to remain on what was, by then, a ten- to 11-
year steady course, meeting but not exceeding its yearly grantmaking 
targets. This was effectively the course that Mr. Healy and Mr. Coates 
had recommended.
ACTUAL
           [Note: figures for 2009 are estimates as of the end of the third quarter.] 
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Fortunately, the next two years did bring continued market growth, 
and with it a strong performance by Atlantic’s investment portfolio. 
Mr. Coates’s “normal” scenario was actually exceeded in 2006 and 
2007 (the Standard and Poor’s 500 index clocked a 15.6 percent re-
turn in 2006 and 5.5 percent in 2007, while Atlantic’s returns were 
14.3 percent and 14.8 percent, respectively). So although Atlantic’s 
grant commitments continued to run well above their targets in both 
years, investment returns were good enough to cover the outlays. But 
in the much harsher market of 2008, grant commitments were again 
above the targets, exceeding the budget by more than $100 million. 
Most of these grants were in the form of multi-year commitments, so 
payments would continue over the next two to four years. As several 
Trustees had pointed out in successive meetings, strong markets do 
not last forever, and excess earnings would someday be needed to 
provide for leaner times.
The global financial meltdown of 2008 soon drove this point home. 
Although Atlantic’s portfolio performed significantly better than av-
erage through this crisis, its ability to cover even budgeted levels of 
grantmaking suddenly seemed much more tenuous. Investment staff 
was asked late in the year to prepare an update on the endowment, 
and their analysis, delivered at the beginning of 2009, was sobering: 
Market losses and continued payments on big commitments had 
pushed the current value below what the original grantmaking plan 
had contemplated. Further over-commitment could soon “lead to the 
need to sell attractive assets meant for the longer term at currently 
unattractive prices.” If this continued, the result could be a liquidity 
crisis in three to four years’ time: “Due to current market conditions,  
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we are forced to sell our more liquid assets to cover payments, leading 
to the portfolio becoming more illiquid, which could become a prob-
lem if markets do not recover within a few years.” In the worst case, 
if current market conditions persisted or worsened, the foundation 
might find itself without enough cash on hand to make even those 
grant payments that it had already committed, although this would 
not happen for several years. 
Annual grant targets were promptly trimmed. The 2009 budget, 
which had initially been set at $375 million (the inflation-adjusted 
equivalent of the $350m steady-state target), was summarily cut by 
$20 million in mid-year. Program staff scrambled to revise grantmak-
ing plans that had been months, sometimes years, in the making. 
Still, because earlier budgets had been based solely on commitments, 
rather than actual payments, there was little the foundation could 
do to trim the “tail” of already-promised payments that earlier com-
mitments had set in motion. In June 2009, the grant tail consisted of 
some $850 million in committed dollars that were yet to be paid—a 
sum that placed a priority claim on future cash flow for several years. 
If the foundation was going to manage its annual cash disbursements 
more carefully from now on, as investment officers were recommend-
ing, it would have to begin budgeting cash payments, not just com-
mitments. And it would have to adhere to the budgets it made.
The change may seem obvious, but it was a profound shift to an insti-
tution in which commitments, not payments, had long been the sole 
unit of planning. As Atlantic was learning the hard way, budgets in 
which grant commitments are held steady do not necessarily lead to 
a steady outflow of cash. For most of its history, a grant commitment 
at Atlantic may have extended over as many as five years—or it might 
have been paid out all at once. Knowing that the institution commit-
ted $350 million in Year X gave no clear indication, by itself, of how 
much money would actually flow out of the foundation accounts in 
Year X or Year X+1 or any of the next three or four years after that. 
Even so, until recently Atlantic’s financial managers had made a de-
pendable science of forecasting how much cash would be needed 
to fund annual commitments and then ensuring that the portfolio 
would supply the necessary liquidity. Their models ran into trouble, 
however, with the confluence of three developments that together 
upended many of the assumptions on which the forecasts had been 
based. The first of these developments was the surge in grant com-
mitments above the annual targets, beginning in 2006. Second was 
the effect that the 2008 market crisis was having on grantees, many 
of whom were experiencing sudden drops in funding and turning to 
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Atlantic for emergency aid. (When major human-rights funders like 
the Jeht and Picower Foundations collapsed in the Bernard Madoff 
debacle, Atlantic took the lead in forming a foundation consortium 
to help grantees whose promised support had just evaporated.) The 
third factor was the U.S. national elections of November 2008, which 
brought to office a president and Congress more inclined toward 
some of Atlantic’s program initiatives. The resulting opportunity for 
additional grants on U.S. domestic issues—many of which were quick 
projects calling for immediate payouts—drove up both the commit-
ments and the cash outflow in 2009 and beyond. All of this was hap-
pening at a time when the liquidity of the portfolio itself was worsen-
ing because of the financial crisis and the market environment. 
These were serious pressures, but they would likely have been more 
manageable in the foundation’s earlier years, when coffers were full 
and timelines were fluid.  Now, though, when the endowment had 
fewer and fewer years to recoup any lost value, a sudden drop in capi-
tal combined with a surge of outlays posed grave problems, both im-
mediate and longer-term. 
In 2009, for the first time, program staff began working with annual 
payment caps, to ensure that money would be available when prom-
ised. The new plan called for a gradually declining annual expendi-
ture on grants and operating costs: less than $550 million in 2009, 
$500 million in 2010, $450 million in 2011, then $400 million in 2012 
and beyond. In effect, these adjustments would gradually bring the 
foundation back into line with the original steady-state plan that had 
been drawn up before the mid-decade boom years of big grants and 
high returns. But although the financial adjustment would be gradu-
al, the change in operating and budgeting practice would be immedi-
ate and pronounced. A whole institution trained to think in commit-
ment terms will now be focusing on cash flow as well.
One staff member clarified the change this way: “It’s not that we never 
tracked cash before. Whenever commitments were made, there was 
always a very good process for tracking the payments; it was all very 
well controlled. But there have never been limits put on the aggregate 
amount of cash that goes out in any given year, because it always just 
kind of worked out okay. Some grants had very long tails; some had 
shorter tails. But on average, there was never a problem. Now there 
is, and now we’re going to start thinking about payments first, rather 
than as an afterthought.”
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BACK TO A STEADY STATE
Despite the financial vicissitudes of the first eight years, a senior 
Atlantic official predicted in late 2009 that “we’re not going out of 
business any earlier” than 2017. “We have a plan that requires period-
ic adjustment. At one point, it looked like we could spend at a steady 
state of $350 million in 2007 dollars, and for a time it even looked like 
we could go up a bit. Now a more conservative estimate would have 
us spending somewhere upwards of $300 million, but not as high 
as $350. The numbers could go back up, but we’re trying to take as 
conservative an approach as possible. The grantmaking budget came 
down a bit this year [in 2009] and it will come down a bit in 2010. This 
will be the first year that we will end right on target with grantmak-
ing. . . . But we don’t have a margin for error. So if the annual number 
has to be adjusted, it will be. But the timeline isn’t going to change 
significantly.”
Senior managers have intensified their review of commitments, pay-
ments, and returns on the portfolio, conducted frequently through-
out the year. Between reviews, an internal management “dashboard” 
contains the most current figures showing where cash payments and 
commitments stand relative to forecasts. These reviews and forecasts 
are not new—they have been part of the foundation’s routine finan-
cial management since the start of the spend-down. But both staff 
and Board members say they have become more vigilant in monitor-
ing and adjusting for any major deviation from the long-term plan. 
One manager who participates in the regular regimen of comparison 
and adjustments describes the process this way:
“We keep what we call a ‘spend-down model,’ which is simply an 
[electronic] spreadsheet which projects out the spend-down path. 
Inputs into it include the expected portfolio returns, expected liquid-
ity from various segments of the portfolio, the tail of current grants 
already committed with their expected payouts, and assumptions for 
future annual commitments for grants and their payouts, as well as 
expected operating costs. We also track where we are from an asset 
value perspective versus where we expected to be when we first did the 
model. We expect variation around the central expected spend-down 
line, but if the variation gets too big, we can adjust up or down the 
future grants to enable us to finish at the right time. We actually run 
two versions of the model: a normal-return and a reduced-return sce-
nario. We can also use the model to run as many different scenarios 
as we see fit, and have done so at different points in time.”
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Barring a serious market setback, managers believe that the process 
of review and revision comes in plenty of time to restore the prospect 
of a steady state of grantmaking through 2016, with a wind-down and 
conclusion thereafter. The net result of the decade’s great fluctua-
tions—the recessions in 2000-03 and 2008-09 and, in between, the 
bull market of 2005-07—has been to bring the value of the endow-
ment back in line with original forecasts. Though strained some-
what by years of above-target commitments, the original model has 
been essentially re-established, with slightly reduced activity in the 
near term. From there on, the discipline of periodic reviews and cor-
rections is designed to keep the model on track, or to revise it in a 
thoughtful way, before the final years in which there will be no re-
maining room for adjustment.
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In June 2008, Gara LaMarche, who had succeeded John R. Healy as 
Atlantic’s third CEO some 18 months earlier, wrote to the founda-
tion’s Board that it was “time to start thinking and planning” for the 
foundation’s concluding stages. “We have a plan for assuring the 
flow of funds to maintain a planned level of grantmaking” between 
now and the expected end-date, he wrote. “We have a plan for assur-
ing the stability of key staffing. We do not have a plan for leaving the 
fields and countries in which we work in a manner that protects and 
sustains the investments we have made. We have some ideas, and it’s 
not a matter to which no thought has been given. But we do not have a 
plan, institution-wide or within particular programmes or regions.”
“We won’t have a meaningful legacy,” he continued, “much less the 
kind we might wish for ourselves, if we don’t think about this now—if 
we don’t imagine the end of Atlantic and work back from there.”7 
The statement was a blunt but fair summary of where Atlantic stood 
less than a decade before it was scheduled to end its operation. It 
was certainly not true that the foundation had done no program 
planning. But it had done little or no planning that focused specifi-
cally on how the programs would end, by what time, and with what 
final results. At the time of Mr. LaMarche’s paper, program staff were 
midway through their second major round of strategic planning, 
a process that he had set in motion soon after taking over as CEO. 
The first round, in 2002-2003, had constituted the beginning of the 
streamlined, four-field program mix that Mr. Healy and the Board had 
decided on shortly after deciding to spend the foundation out of exis-
tence. In that exercise, the goal had not been to “imagine the end of 
Atlantic,” but something like the opposite: to outline the goals of four 
substantially new programs on children, aging, health, and human 
7. Gara LaMarche, “The End of Atlantic as We Know It: Time to Start Thinking and Planning— 
A Thought Paper for the Atlantic Board,” unpublished manuscript, June 23, 2008, p. 1.
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rights; to design a strategy for them; and to set them in motion. It was 
an exercise almost entirely devoted to beginnings, not endings.
“It was too soon,” said one senior manager at the time, “to be plan-
ning particular accomplishments by particular dates. We were set-
ting strategies up, not winding them down yet. The whole idea of the 
steady state was that we were going to go into these fields, we were go-
ing to have a clear strategy, but we were also going to learn, see what 
worked, build on the promising bits and shift away from other things. 
The time would come later, once we had a sense of what was really 
taking hold, when we could start to say, ‘We’re going to start wind-
ing this down, we’re going to redouble our efforts on that, and we’re 
going to end by trying to accomplish these two or three big things by 
Year X.’ ” 
A LEGACY OF LASTING CHANGE
In short, the strategic vision that governed Mr. Healy’s years was not 
primarily one of a philanthropy shutting down, but of one build-
ing up. Still, that does not mean that the Board and management 
were not preoccupied with questions of legacy, more than might 
be typical at other foundations. In fact, arguably the first word 
the Atlantic Philanthropies published on the subject of its spend-
down, at the top of a paper prepared by Mr. Healy in March 2003 
and co-signed with Mr. Feeney, was “legacy.” Under the general title 
“Legacy and Purpose,” and the opening heading “Legacy,” the state-
ment’s first sentence read, “Our vision of the future of The Atlantic 
Philanthropies is to create a legacy, through our work, which is wor-
thy of the generosity which brought us into existence.”
The statement announced that the foundation would “spend down 
our total endowment and expect this to take between 12 and 15 years. 
When we have spent down and completed our work we would like to 
be remembered for:
• Our belief in the value and importance of “giving while living”
• Philanthropy of enduring impact, characterized by
 –  a tight focus on our programs and geographies
 –  a willingness to place big bets and to make long-term  
 investments
 –  an accent on solvable problems
 –  a readiness to take risks in the fields and geographies 
 we tackle
 –  a proactive, pragmatic, and entrepreneurial approach
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 –  a willingness to support advocacy
• Our concern for the disadvantaged and vulnerable
• A modest and selfless operating style.”
The statement then articulated a formal mission statement, the 
foundation’s first: “to bring about lasting changes that will improve the 
lives of disadvantaged and vulnerable people.”  It added an additional 
“guiding principle”: “to demonstrate the value and benefits of Giving 
While Living . . . to increase the number of philanthropists who distribute 
their charitable funds while they are alive, and thereby to expand phil-
anthropic funding.” Although it was meant as a formal corporate man-
ifesto, the paper’s vision of the foundation and its aspirations also 
appealed to Mr. Feeney on a personal level, according to a Trustee 
who spoke to him about it at the time. “He was very happy with it,” 
the Trustee recalls, “and with the emphasis on disadvantage and vul-
nerability. Even when he was giving money to big institutions like re-
search institutions and medical centers, and working with university 
presidents and hospital CEOs, he was always interested in how these 
grants were going to benefit disadvantaged people, both directly and 
indirectly. Those are the things that have always had real meaning for 
him. And this mission made that explicit.”
In a briefing note to the staff the day after the Board adopted this 
statement, Mr. Healy expanded on how the new language would guide 
the scope of the four program areas and the completion of strategic 
plans on each of them. But like the statement itself, Mr. Healy’s note 
to the staff expressly avoided any discussion about what substantive 
legacies might ultimately be hoped for, or precisely what “lasting 
changes” the programs might plan to make in 12 or 15 years’ time. 
Rather, it said, “the Board shares the view of management and staff 
that our best learning about the new fields will result from actually 
making grants in them.” 
For all its introductory emphasis on completions, conclusions, and 
legacies, the body of the statement—and virtually all of the staff 
briefing that followed it—was essentially a broad articulation of 
philanthropic purpose. It would have been equally at home in any 
thoughtful, well-run, perpetual foundation. It was a first step in a 
new approach to grantmaking, but it was not a significant first step 
in spending down, at least not explicitly. To the extent that the mes-
sage addressed the way the foundation would use up its endowment 
and complete its mission, the answer seemed to be: by being a top-
quality foundation and seeking lasting, positive change, as any foun-
dation might want to do. As one member of the Board later pointed 
out, “Nearly all foundations exit their programs sooner or later. We’ll 
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be exiting ours. Yes, our exit will be a little more final than theirs, 
because we won’t be around for a second act. But basically, the chal-
lenge is the same: to achieve something important and lasting in 
a long but not indefinite amount of time. We still had 15 years left, 
which is a lot longer than many perpetual foundations stay in a given 
field. So there was no reason for us, at that point, to be fixated on 
spending down. Our job was to worry about doing good, and doing  
it well.” 
Nor had the four new program areas been selected particularly for 
their fitness for a spend-down regimen. Instead, they were chosen 
primarily based on three criteria: the particular kinds of expertise rep-
resented on Atlantic’s staff and Board, the depth of the social need in 
each of the countries where Atlantic worked, and the likelihood that 
the foundation could make a meaningful, long-term difference in 
the chosen fields. The search for broad program categories, a Trustee 
explained, had everything to do with identifying big philanthropic 
opportunity, and little or nothing to do with the spend-down calen-
dar: “If you’re going to spend out the money, then one of two things 
has to happen. Either you pick program areas where the problems 
are serious and complex, and therefore justify big grants, or you pick 
ones you think you can literally solve in six years. The latter would be 
very boring, and there would be very few of them—if any. So if you’re 
serious about trying to tackle complex problems that have been with 
us forever, the decision to spend down only has to do with the rate of 
speed with which you apply assets in the hope that they’ll make a dif-
ference. It doesn’t determine what area you invest in.” 
Within the four chosen programs, however, Mr. Healy and the staff 
were charged with ensuring that the foundation’s particular lines 
of grantmaking would fit the projected timetable and would reach 
a conclusion “worthy of the generosity which brought us into exis-
tence.” In that respect, as one Trustee put it, “we did envision the pro-
gram as being designed for a limited life. While it’s true the program 
categories aren’t necessarily time-specific, and weren’t chosen with 
a deadline in mind, the things we decided to do within those catego-
ries needed to be very carefully delineated with our lifespan in mind. 
That wasn’t something that we, as a Board, could do or ought to do. 
Selecting particular sub-fields and strategies and so on is a staff func-
tion, which we reviewed very carefully and made many comments 
and adjustments on. That is where all the lifespan calculations were 
made, and they were made very consciously and deliberately.”
As another Board member put it, “If your main concern was tak-
ing on work that you could wrap up in 15 years, would you pick 
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disadvantaged children—who will always be with us? Obviously not. 
But there are a great many things you could do to benefit children in 
a lasting way that can be accomplished in 15 years, and that’s true of 
most fields. So the challenge was to pick fields where we had confi-
dence that we could do important things in the time remaining, and 
do them well. And that’s what we did.”
Not every Board member necessarily found the mission statement 
compelling; not everyone was excited about every field selected for 
concentrated effort. Some believed that a more deliberate match 
could have been made between the foundation’s expected lifespan 
and its chosen fields of endeavor. Others felt that fine-gauged at-
tempts at timing and predicting results were bound to err and there-
fore were not critical in designing a program. In any event, these were 
relatively minor disagreements and they quickly faded from discus-
sion. Taken together, the Board decided that this mission, with these 
four areas of focus, offered what one of them called “a chance to do 
something historic, to leave a legacy commensurate with the kinds of 
resources we were about to put into it.”  
‘FOCUSING THE MIND’
Even though the Atlantic grants program was not designed primar-
ily in response to the decision to spend down, the presence of an end 
date on the distant horizon unquestionably had an effect on the way 
both staff and Board members thought about their work. Time af-
ter time, in describing how the programs took shape in those years, 
employees and Trustees invoked Samuel Johnson’s maxim about 
how the prospect of a hanging focuses the mind. (Though often para-
phrased, the quote as reported by Thomas Boswell is, “When a man 
knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind 
wonderfully.”) 
So even though the initial program strategies drafted in 2002-03 con-
tained little reference to the fact that they would all be ending in 15 
years’ time, there was a sense of urgency and finality to them, as one 
longtime staffer explains: “The bar certainly was higher. From now 
on, you would get a chance to fail only once. In most public-sector 
and voluntary organizations, you get to fail several times. You just 
redefine the problem, adjust the model, pat yourself on the back for 
learning a lot, and then try again. But here, it’ll be just once. And 
therefore if you fail—so to speak, assuming you could measure that in 
our business—well, that would be your epitaph. Because you wouldn’t 
have any way back.”
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One consequence of this “focusing of the mind” has been a preoccu-
pation—visible from the earliest program strategies—with creating 
durable institutions, movements, and funding streams. The ultimate 
objectives of these four programs (healthy populations, equal oppor-
tunity for children and seniors, secure guarantees of human rights) 
are unlikely to be achieved in Atlantic’s lifetime, as nearly everyone 
acknowledges. So a lasting “legacy,” in most observers’ view, would 
have to take one of two forms: either a significant leap forward, mark-
ing a profound and lasting improvement over current conditions, or 
else the creation of an engine of change that is capable of seeing the 
cause through to future success. 
In reviewing program strategies, the Board insisted on four criteria 
that, as one member put it, “would make sure that we concentrate on 
doing something with permanent impact by the time we’re done.” 
First and most obvious was that proposals had to be consistent with 
the mission and the spirit of “Legacy and Purpose.” Second, programs 
should normally be built around established organizations and lead-
ers, so that time and money could be used in achieving results rather 
than creating new capacity from scratch. Third, in the same Board 
member’s words, “there had to be leverage, with the state or public 
entities or from private donors as funding partners, to ensure the 
sustainability of whatever we’re supporting.” And fourth, programs 
should put a premium on improving public policy, which would ul-
timately affect far more people than the foundation—or even all of 
philanthropy combined—could accomplish on its own. Although 
some grants might represent an exception to one or more of these 
principles, the “big bets” would, as the Trustee described it, “need to 
tick all four boxes.” 
Nurturing durable institutions, organizing coalitions and networks of 
effective organizations, recruiting new donors, advocating for favor-
able public policies and government funding—all these goals feature 
prominently in the original program plans. And they have continued 
to play a central role, often becoming even more pronounced, in later 
revisions and updates. But in the original version of the program 
strategies, drafted at the start of a relatively optimistic period in glob-
al markets and politics, the drive to create complex, systemic reforms 
and lasting, well-funded movements seems especially bullish when 
viewed from the harsh economic climate of 2008-09.
In 2002, the Celtic tiger was roaring; dramatic reconciliation pro-
cesses in Northern Ireland and South Africa had made advances that 
would have seemed fanciful just a decade earlier; economic and tech-
nological modernization was transforming Vietnamese society. Even 
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the United States—though deeply unsettled by the tech bubble, 9/11, 
and the impending Iraq invasion, and starting to feel the domestic-
policy retrenchments of the George W. Bush years—seemed awash in 
new philanthropy and poised for a rapid rise out of recession. It was 
a time when the leap from innovation to lasting change seemed not 
merely achievable but predictable.
As a result, the most important challenge at the time seemed to be 
ensuring that the programs were pursuing the right innovations. 
In the years when the four programs were first being designed and 
implemented, it was the discipline of “logic modeling”—identifying, 
fueling, and arranging the forces of change for likely impact—that 
stood in the foreground of the foundation’s thinking and planning. 
Spending down was an implicit, but often not explicit, part of that 
discipline. “There were the two things, and it’s hard to disconnect 
them,” a staff veteran recalls. “There was the spend-down, and then 
there was also the introduction of logic modeling, this notion of work-
ing to outcomes. They happened in concert. So whereas the spend-
down was the broad discipline you had to apply, it was kind of like 
knowing you’re going to die someday. It makes you want to do some-
thing positive during your lifetime, but it doesn’t necessarily start you 
making funeral arrangements. So for example, it would have influ-
enced us in those days: ‘Well, there’s no point in taking on something 
so long-term that it’s way after our ending.’ But the planning itself 
was of course shorter-term—we worked on three-year terms anyway. 
Both things governed how we thought and talked and wrote about 
these programs. But the shorter-term issues were the ones we had to 
wrestle with now. The spend-down was more of a far limit on what we 
could do, rather than an immediate influence.”
Another staff member at the time succinctly agreed: “The visibility of 
spend-down, in any operational sense, was limited, to be honest.”
REVISING AND REVISITING
Soon after Gara LaMarche became CEO in early 2007, he launched 
a second round of strategic planning in the programs, to review 
where they had come in the past three to four years and to refine, 
re-focus, and update their strategies. In a statement to the Board 
that November, he argued that “Every question . . . proceeds from a 
prior one of what makes sense in light of the fact that we have a lim-
ited lifespan. And the single greatest consequence of that decision 
and question is that, despite the considerable size of our resources 
relative to all but a handful of foundations, we wish to be extremely 
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focused.”8  For Mr. LaMarche, at this stage of his thinking at least, 
the challenge of spending down responsibly had mostly to do with 
harvesting the lessons of the past few years and aiming the programs 
more narrowly at the things that were showing the greatest prom-
ise. One goal of the new strategic review, he wrote, would be that the 
foundation “will do a number of fewer things” and will adopt “clearer 
standards to guide our programme decisions.” And chief among 
those standards would be achieving “impact, within the context of 
our decision to spend our assets in the next ten years.”
Admittedly, Mr. LaMarche continued, the desire for impact is noth-
ing new in philanthropy: “Who doesn’t want to make an impact?” But 
in his vision for Atlantic, the impact would not be measured solely as 
most foundations measure it, in ways that are “tangible and close to 
hand: the kids in the afterschool programme, the new instruments 
for the orchestra,” and so on. Instead, Atlantic’s yardstick for impact 
would have even more to do with “systemic change, . . . more state 
funding for the afterschool programme, increased government and 
private support for the arts”—things that reflected a new and bet-
ter way of conducting public business. The foundation’s interest in 
building lasting institutions, policies, and funding streams, which 
had been a prominent but diffuse element of the earlier plans, would 
now be the central means of focusing and concentrating effort in the 
next round of strategic planning. But the target of this effort would 
increasingly have government at its bull’s-eye. For the issues on which 
Atlantic is concentrating, he wrote, government “is the only level at 
which these problems can be seriously addressed. So we choose to 
engage in supporting advocacy for increased and smarter government 
funding, and stronger and fairer laws.”
Mr. LaMarche then went on to list 13 questions that would deter-
mine where the greatest opportunity for impact and systemic reform 
might lie. Among these was whether the problem and the proposed 
solutions were big enough to improve the lives of disadvantaged 
and vulnerable people fundamentally; whether measurable prog-
ress could be achieved “within Atlantic’s lifespan”; whether an 
idea might be “transformative without needing to be permanent”; 
whether a big investment now would “reduce the dimensions of the 
problem later,” and whether other funding partners, including gov-
ernment, could be rallied to the cause before Atlantic exits the scene. 
The majority of the paper then went on to apply these questions 
individually to the four program areas and the various geographical 
settings, suggesting ways in which they might lead to a sharper focus 
8. Gara LaMarche, “Focus, Impact, and Legacy: How Should We Think—and Re-Think—About 
Them?” unpublished manuscript, November 2007. 
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in each instance. Although the paper was written months before the 
global economic collapse, it was already showing a consciousness of 
limits and of diminishing time that had been far more muted in ear-
lier planning documents.
The coming year would make those constraints all the more pressing. 
Besides dealing a sudden blow to Atlantic’s endowment, the collapse 
of world markets in the fall of 2008 soon brought the government of 
Ireland to near-ruin, and severely depleted the resources and will for 
public initiatives in Northern Ireland. Although South Africa suffered 
less from the financial crisis than other countries, its politics were 
unsettled by rifts within the African National Congress in 2008 and 
the presidential election a year later. In the United States, the results 
of the November election made the policy environment seem more 
favorable to Atlantic’s agenda than it had been in years, but economic 
constraints, including a sharp downturn in philanthropic giving, 
nonetheless darkened the horizon.
In short, within months after Mr. LaMarche submitted his first major 
strategic statement to the Board, circumstances around the world 
would make his emphasis on focus, impact, and advocacy even more 
crucial to the foundation’s hope of success in the decade or less that 
remained of its life. 
In concluding his 2007 paper, however, there was one idea that 
Mr. LaMarche took pains to de-emphasize, and that was “legacy.” 
“Worrying about your long-term legacy can be paralyzing to action in 
the here and now,” he wrote. “Either legacy is the cumulative effect 
of impact in various areas, or it is somewhat random—some of what 
we do may endure, much may not, and we have no way of telling right 
now.” It would be better, he argued, to concentrate on making a tan-
gible difference in each of the fields and places where the foundation 
was working, and to try to make those accomplishments as durable as 
possible. Which of them might later be regarded as history changing, 
the paper strongly suggested, was a matter best left to history.
THE ‘LARGER VISION’ FIRST, 
THEN THE TIMELINES
The round of strategic reviews that Mr. LaMarche launched in 2007 
continued into 2009, with detailed plans reaching the Board one-
by-one for approval in the intervening months. Each of the revised 
plans bore the clear mark of the foundation’s new emphasis on focus 
and impact. The number of objectives and activities were reduced 
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somewhat, and indicators of progress and impact were updated and 
clarified. A unifying theme or framework for the programs, built 
around an overarching goal of social justice, helped draw the various 
activities into a clearer, foundation-wide focus. But one thing the new 
plans did not change from their earlier versions was the absence of 
any specific discussion about how the planned activities would wind 
down. Even in the sections discussing longer-term goals—things 
that might take several years to achieve, or might even lie beyond 
Atlantic’s life expectancy—there was little indication of how the foun-
dation would draw its effort to a close, how it would decide what ac-
tivities to wind down first, or what work (if any) it would hope to hand 
off to others. 
One exception to this rule, in a sense, was the increased emphasis in 
all of the revised plans on building durable organizations and move-
ments, creating powerful advocacy campaigns, and attracting new or 
increased funding to Atlantic’s grantees and fields of interest. These 
efforts—generally referred to as “capacity-building” (for stronger or-
ganizations) and “sustainability” (for better-funded fields)—clearly 
aimed at paving a long-term path beyond Atlantic’s lifetime. Although 
the plans almost never said so, the attention to capacity and sustain-
ability was the clearest indication that the programs were meant for 
a relatively short life and were beginning, at least, to consider what 
might lie beyond the horizon.
On the surface, however, the new documents could have been drawn 
up, almost word-for-word, in any perpetual foundation that took 
strategic planning seriously. Indeed, as one program staffer pointed 
out, the harsher economic climate of 2008 would have made it all but 
unthinkable for any foundation not to devote more attention to ques-
tions of capacity and sustainability, spend-down or no. As a senior 
employee put it, “All the staff—and all the plans, if you read them 
carefully—have a sense of limited time and the need to prepare for an 
exit. But mainly, they’re about focusing the program, incorporating 
new information and ideas, revising the assumptions. They’re about 
operating good programs, not limited-life programs specifically.”
“The challenge,” he continues, “is that when you translate that into 
a spend-down, where you need to have actual closure about things, 
you need a process around it, with clarity for everyone. That’s not in 
any plan or anything else yet. It’s interesting that most of [the pro-
gram staff] are assuming that 2016 is the date, or 2017, or something, 
and they’re assuming that their budgets will remain broadly stable 
until then. If you read the strategies, there’s nothing in there to sug-
gest otherwise. But surely not everything is just going to coast along 
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until 2016, with every program making its last commitments all at 
the same time, at 11:59 on New Year’s Eve. On some level, everyone 
knows that somebody, some line of work, is going to have to go soon-
er. And that could be starting just a couple of years from now. There 
could be programs or sub-programs out there that have only a couple 
of years to live, but don’t know it yet. Everybody is assuming—or any-
way, everybody is acting like they assume—that someone else is going 
to have to take the fall, and their own program is going to soldier on 
right to the very end.”
To be sure, a few branches of program activity are expressly prepar-
ing to wind down before the foundation’s ultimate sunset. Grants 
for out-of-school-time programs in the United States, integrated 
Catholic-Protestant education in Northern Ireland, palliative care in 
the Republic of Ireland, and legal representation for indigent defen-
dants in the United States are all being planned for completion in the 
near term. But these involve a relatively small number of grantees, 
and most have good odds for continued funding from other sources. 
Collectively, they represent a small fraction of Atlantic’s total pro-
gram portfolio. They are, in a sense, the exceptions that prove a larger 
rule: As one senior manager put it, “We are not planning as if we were 
going to be out of business in six or seven years. We need to start do-
ing that now, but that isn’t how we’ve been thinking thus far.”
That reluctance to focus on sunsets and conclusions is not an acci-
dent, in this manager’s view, nor is it a mistake. “The first and most 
important thing we are concentrating on is having an impact. Yes, we 
want to plan so we have that impact, or so we see it taking shape, in 
the next six or seven years. But that’s got to be part of a larger vision. 
So the trick is to lay out the vision in its fullest form, and then figure 
out what is most strategic to do to get there—as opposed to starting 
with a more constrained vision of what would be easy to accomplish 
in x-many months or years. Because that way, you run the risk of 
thinking too small, of concentrating just on what will happen in a few 
years, rather than on what’s necessary, rather than on what big differ-
ence you want your work to make. Get that big picture right, as  
I think we’re doing, and then is the time to start asking how you wind 
it down.”
Mr. LaMarche incorporated this phased approach into his 2008 
paper for the Trustees, titled “The End of Atlantic as We Know It.” 
In that statement, he described the foundation’s future as falling 
roughly into three “trimesters”—three-year periods beginning with 
the period 2009 to 2011. In these years, he wrote, “we should ease 
out of any programme initiatives that are not aligned with a more 
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narrowed strategic focus or that are not getting the kind of trac-
tion we need and want, and we should consider and launch any new 
strategies or expand them to other geographies.” In this period, 
the foundation is also experimenting with a more loosely defined 
Venture Fund, a budget set aside for seizing unforeseen possibilities, 
such as “short-term advocacy opportunities within our mission and 
programmes.” This included a large grant in 2009 to Health Care for 
America Now, a public advocacy effort aimed at shaping the national 
debate on health care in the United States, a top priority of the new 
Obama Administration.
The next period, 2012-2014, would be “the time for us to solidify and 
deepen our core commitments, exiting out of other ones.” In this pe-
riod, some programs would shrink faster than others, and “we would 
in all likelihood make fewer grants and begin to lay the groundwork 
for the final three years of exit commitments.” In those last years, 
2015-2017, “almost everything would be focused on leaving the fields, 
organizations, and countries of operation in as strong a shape as pos-
sible for a world without the foundation.”9 
THE ‘SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGE’
From the foundation’s internal perspective, the need for focused dis-
cussions on how the spend-down will proceed, and how the fields and 
grantees will survive it, may well be able to wait until 2015. But from 
the vantage point of many grantees—especially those that could find 
themselves on the “exit” list in the 2012-2014 period—the prospect 
of Atlantic’s departure opens up a number of gaping questions that 
many have yet to confront realistically. Some grantees, in fact, seem to 
be living in what one Atlantic officer called “a state of cheerful deni-
al.” Beyond the few fields that are already receiving or expecting their 
terminal commitments, a great many grantees appear to be expecting 
their support from Atlantic to continue all the way through the end 
of the next decade. More than a few imagine (unrealistically, in many 
cases) that they will ultimately receive an endowment, or at least tie-
off funding large enough to fuel an endowment campaign.
In November 2008, Atlantic’s general counsel, David Sternlieb, and 
financial controller David Walsh prepared an analysis of the sustain-
ability issues facing the foundation, its grantees, and their fields. 
Their memo focused on grantee “dependency” on Atlantic support, 
“on the theory that high dependency today could translate into high 
9. Gara LaMarche, “The End of Atlantic,” pp. 3-4.
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grantee mortality when we close our doors.”10 Focusing on the years 
2005-07, they defined grantees as “dependent” if they receive more 
than one-third of their annual budget from Atlantic in those two 
years. “This measure is crude,” they acknowledged. “Among other 
things, the test . . . makes binary what is a question of degree.” Even 
so, the standard was high enough to describe a situation that would 
almost certainly alarm both a departing funder and a dependent 
grantee. Yet a review of 166 Atlantic grantees yielded 59—35.5 per-
cent—that fit the description. Worse, the average share of all annual 
budgets that was being met by Atlantic was 53 percent. The situation 
was worse outside the United States: Dependency ran to 50 percent in 
Bermuda, South Africa, and Northern Ireland, and 60 percent in the 
Irish Republic. 
The memo went on to outline several reasons for the dependency 
problem—among them the fact that Atlantic concentrates on several 
issues and countries where other philanthropy is scarce and grantee 
organizations are therefore fragile. The foundation has also ex-
pressly sought to create and build significant new institutions, which 
in turn may take several years to establish themselves and diversify 
their funding. But the fundamental question—one that could ulti-
mately mean life or death to some grantees—was what Atlantic could 
do to mitigate the dependency problem before it closes its doors. 
“We can endow grantees,” the memo notes, citing the conceptually 
simplest solution, “but we cannot count on endowing many of them. 
For example, $350 million—a year’s worth of steady-state grantmak-
ing—produces a 30-year annual, inflation-adjusted revenue stream 
of only $20 million, or a 20-year stream of $26 million, and then only 
if we assume that financially unsophisticated grantees can generate 
4 percent real returns annually.” In short, endowments might be an 
option in a few instances, but if so, those cases will necessarily be 
rare and costly.
The memo then raises the other most likely avenues of long-term sup-
port: attracting other foundations, winning dedicated funding from 
government, and boosting contributions from individual donors. All 
these options already feature prominently in the programs’ strategic 
plans, but all have been viewed as steep challenges. And that was be-
fore the 2008 recession.
The remaining solution, Mr. Sternlieb and Mr. Walsh concluded, 
would be “shrinking the gap” by “weaving sustainability into our pro-
grams, our grantmaking approach, and our other planning sooner 
10. David Sternlieb and David Walsh, “Spend-Down: The Sustainability Challenge,” unpublished 
memorandum, Nov. 11, 2008. 
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rather than later.” If endowments are to be considered in some cases, 
they argued, the planning for such big allocations would need to 
begin soon, to be certain that there is sufficient money at the end of 
the road to supply the capital. In other cases, they noted, the end of a 
project, or even the closing or merger of whole grantee organizations, 
would not necessarily be catastrophic, provided that this is planned 
and prepared for well in advance. Other steps, like supporting fund-
raising and other “capacity-building” efforts, forming co-funding 
partnerships with other donors, and advocating for government sup-
port, are already under way, but these take years to bear fruit and will 
demand considerable staff time and attention along the way. 
The memo ends by urging caution, throughout the foundation, “that 
our support over the next few years does not set our grantees up for a 
fall by creating a long-term sustainability problems. Success requires 
treating sustainability as more than a grantee-specific inquiry and 
making it a key design element of our programs, our grantmaking ap-
proach, and our organizational strategy generally.”
ENVISIONING THE END
To some extent, of course, sustainability is “a grantee-specific in-
quiry,” or at least field-specific and country-specific, in the sense that 
the means of sustaining different kinds of activity will necessarily be 
profoundly different from field to field and place to place. Health or 
education reforms in Ireland, South Africa, and the United States, 
for example, may well become adopted policies of the respective na-
tional governments—politics and economics permitting. But human 
rights organizations in those countries probably won’t and arguably 
shouldn’t be wards of the state. The movement to widen opportuni-
ties for older people may sometimes depend on government action or 
expenditures, but often not. In Communist Vietnam, virtually every-
thing depends on the public sector; in cash-strapped Ireland, pros-
pects for growth in the public sector have all but vanished. In America, 
some branches of domestic policy may be headed for growth, but not 
many, and political winds have a way of shifting abruptly. 
Across Atlantic’s varied landscape of programs and geographies, one 
small, local effort thus far has set out to address both the sustain-
ability challenge and the end of grantmaking with a deliberate, near-
term regimen of planning and preparation. It may provide a model, 
or at least a point of departure, for other parts of the foundation. 
In South Africa, program executive Gerald Kraak has informed the 
country’s gay and lesbian grantees (technically LGBT, for “lesbian, 
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gay, bisexual, and transgender”) that his grant budget for them will 
be depleted by the end of 2011. To help them confront and deal with 
this reality, he gathered the whole field of LGBT organizations, in-
cluding some non-grantees, for a session of scenario planning in 
October 2009. 
The group’s assignment was to envision what would become of 
their movement and goals, as well as their individual organizations, 
when Atlantic’s support ended. Also present were two international 
re-granting organizations, the U.S.-based Synergos Institute and 
Hivos, a funding, advocacy, and technical assistance organization 
sponsored by the Netherlands government. A South African capacity-
building organization called Inyathelo Institute for Advancement, 
which Atlantic helped to create and which had provided manage-
ment, fundraising, and other guidance to many of the grantees in the 
room, likewise participated. 
For two days, a management consultant who specializes in scenario 
planning led the group through various stages of the standard exer-
cise: listing the field’s main constraints and opportunities, the key 
external variables that will shape its future, ways in which these vari-
ables could be altered, and the possible circumstances and condi-
tions in which the organizations might find themselves in five years’ 
time. Mapping these factors on a four-quadrant diagram, the facilita-
tor helped the group pinpoint the primary strategic decisions they 
would have to make in order to point their future trajectory toward 
the most desirable scenarios and away from the most harmful ones. 
Little by little, a cluster of relatively new, often tiny, and mostly fragile 
organizations began to outline a course by which they would solidify 
and take greater control over their movement, expand its reach, and 
draw in new sources of funding and political support. On the third 
day, the grantees met on their own, with no funders or facilitators 
present, to reach a consensus on their next steps.
Other programs and offices across the foundation have worked with 
grantees to pursue additional fundraising, to build their leadership 
and organizational strength, and to envision their future without 
Atlantic. But as Mr. Sternlieb and Mr. Walsh put it, these efforts have 
largely been “grantee-specific.” And few if any of them have been 
premised on a firm date, sooner than 2016 or 2020, by which Atlantic 
funding would disappear. What made the South Africa LGBT gath-
ering remarkable, and possibly unique so far, was that it engaged a 
whole cluster of grantees in confronting the imminent withdrawal of 
their biggest funder and asked them to plan, together with other fi-
nancial and technical supporters, how they would carry on.
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The meeting was just one step in a longer process. Working with 
Synergos, Hivos, and other funders and grantees, Mr. Kraak had also 
convened a strategic workshop in 2008 that drew up a preliminary 
proposal for the creation of a new South African philanthropy, mod-
eled on community foundations in the United States. Its purpose 
would be to aggregate donations from multiple sources to support 
the gay and lesbian movement nationwide. Atlantic, Hivos, and 
other international donors might help to seed the new organization, 
though it would also have to raise considerable support from within 
South Africa. The idea figured prominently in the scenarios that the 
group considered in October, but it was not the only source of future 
support they considered.
Separately, through Inyathelo and other grantees, Atlantic’s South 
Africa office has also been pressing an aggressive advocacy campaign 
for more productive use of two of the national government’s fund-
ing pools that are theoretically earmarked for antipoverty efforts and 
social development: the proceeds of the national lotteries and the 
budget of the National Development Agency. Neither is well managed 
at present; but with major reforms, both could become sources of 
new funding for many areas of Atlantic’s involvement in South Africa, 
including health and rural poverty as well as the LGBT groups. For 
the purposes of the October meeting, these and other efforts became 
available building-blocks for the scenario exercise: practical mea-
sures that could be pursued in the next few years to keep Atlantic’s de-
parture from being a body-blow to a movement it had helped to create 
and expand.
A central strength of the South Africa planning process is that it re-
lies, primarily, on grantees’ own will and choices. It encourages them 
to grapple with their own future, provides them forums and tools for 
developing options, and invites them to offer advice on Atlantic’s 
final contributions to their field. It encourages them to decide, in ad-
vance, how (or whether) they will survive the loss of Atlantic support. 
The process seeks to strike a difficult balance between ensuring, on 
one hand, that the foundation takes responsibility for a supportive, 
constructive exit, and nonetheless recognizing, on the other hand, 
that grantees have the ultimate responsibility for constructing a sus-
tainable future for themselves.
As one of Atlantic’s senior managers put it, “We have a responsibility 
to try to strengthen the fields in which we operate as much as pos-
sible. But it’s a shared responsibility. The groups and the fields with 
which we have relationships are owed notice and assistance and plan-
ning. But they’re not owed—or anyway, we can’t promise them—any 
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particular outcome. The grantees are not wholly owned subsidiaries 
of ours. It’s not our sole responsibility to assure their continued sta-
bility. It’s our responsibility to help them get to the point where they 
have the tools to do that.”
SUSTAINABILITY AS LEGACY
An early strategy paper for Atlantic’s Reconciliation and Human 
Rights program suggested that the foundation’s “most important 
legacy” in that field “would be a sustainable set of organizations with 
the proven ability to protect and advance rights.”11 Something simi-
lar might be said in each of the three other program areas. Seen in 
this light, “sustainability”—the creation of organizations and move-
ments that endure, that carry on the long-term struggle for human 
advancement and social justice beyond Atlantic’s time in the field—
is simply another way of thinking about legacy. And it is a way that 
does not require waiting for a distant judgment of history to know if 
it is worthwhile. 
Given Atlantic’s tradition of institutional self-effacement, one can 
assume that a true “legacy” would not necessarily require that future 
generations specifically identify Atlantic or Mr. Feeney’s donation as 
the prime source of some social benefit. Instead, it would be reason-
able to envision an Atlantic legacy as having played a pivotal role in es-
tablishing vigorous advocates, productive providers of knowledge and 
service, and stable institutions to carry on the philanthropic purposes 
for which the foundation was established. Andrew Carnegie, whose 
thought and example inspired Atlantic’s founding, did much the 
same thing in his multiplication of public libraries across the United 
States. He did not imagine that he could, single-handedly, create a 
national culture of literacy and learning. But he provided the institu-
tions, and engineered the public support, that could serve that goal 
far into the future.
Whether this is the approach to “legacy” that Atlantic chooses to 
adopt is a matter still open to discussion. But it appears to be the ap-
proach that the foundation is gradually settling into, with or without 
deliberate intent, as it inches toward the final stages of its life.
11. Quoted in Sternlieb and Walsh, p. 5. 
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As soon as the Atlantic Trustees decided that the foundation would 
close its doors in roughly 15 years, then-CEO John R. Healy warned 
them that the decision would need to be unveiled with great care. 
“The spend-down will have a huge human resources impact,” he said. 
The professional and psychological effect on Atlantic’s employees 
was one “which management must start planning for immediately.” 
To be told their jobs would all be eliminated and their organization 
would disappear, he imagined, would leave many staff members feel-
ing both expendable and vulnerable, provoking reactions of anxiety 
and betrayal. He envisioned a loss of enthusiasm at best and loyalty at 
worst. Of all the consequences of the decision—for financial manage-
ment, mission, program strategy, grantee relations—it was the effect 
on personnel that had Mr. Healy the most concerned.
“Incorrectly concerned, as it turned out,” he observed years later. 
“After that January meeting, I communicated two things to the staff: 
One, this organization is going out of business. And two, we’re chang-
ing our programs pretty significantly. I have to say, I thought the first 
message was the more important one, because people’s jobs would 
be disappearing! But in actual fact, nobody was bothered about that. 
What they were bothered about was their programs. What was going 
to happen to their programs?”
Some veteran staff members recall the episode in nearly identical 
terms. Said one: “I don’t remember exactly how we were told. There 
was a briefing or something. But I remember giving no thought what-
soever to the fact that we were going to be closing up shop someday. 
There were going to be all these major changes to the program, things 
winding down, new plans, a whole new set of priorities. That was go-
ing to affect my life a lot more than the prospect that, what, some 
decades hence, I’d have to find another job. Who even imagines still 
being in the same job a decade from now?”
4.
PERSONNEL
RETAINING TALENT 
AND PRESERVING MORALE
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A more recent employee, hired well after the spend-down decision 
was public knowledge, likewise described the matter as unimport-
ant in considering a job at Atlantic: “I’ve never worked more than 
six years at any job. I get restless. And look around: Who stays in one 
place forever anymore? I guess I knew, before I interviewed here, that 
it wasn’t going to be a permanent job that I would retire from some-
day. But I didn’t ask about that, and I’m not even sure it came up in 
my interview. If it did, it didn’t come up for long. I never expected to 
be here when I retired, and I don’t expect to be here when Atlantic 
shuts its doors. They probably won’t need me that long, and anyway I 
probably couldn’t stay in one place that long.”
‘WHERE AM I GOING TO GET 
ANOTHER JOB LIKE THIS ONE?’
It was not unreasonable for Mr. Healy to expect some anxiety from 
employees when they heard the news. Jobs at Atlantic are widely re-
garded as among the best in philanthropy, and the thought of losing 
such a job would be disquieting for many people. Not only are the 
compensation and benefits above-average for the field, but the lean, 
relatively flat structure of the organization gives many employees, 
even at more junior levels, a scope of authority and independence 
that would be much narrower elsewhere. The intellectual environ-
ment, many employees say, is stimulating. Few institutions in the 
world distribute so much money each year, so the potential for enor-
mous influence is great. Most of all, Atlantic invests heavily in several 
fields, like aging and human rights, and in some countries, such as 
Ireland and South Africa, where few other foundations have much of  
a presence. For anyone deeply committed to those fields and coun-
tries, the prospect of finding a similar job at some other institution  
is remote. 
But 15 years—or even ten, or eight—is a distant horizon for most 
people’s career planning. And although it’s almost certainly true that 
some jobs will be eliminated sooner than that, employees interviewed 
for this report said—to a person—that the time for worrying about 
next steps simply hasn’t come yet.
A few people, mostly in their 40s or early 50s at the time this is writ-
ten, acknowledge “doing the math,” as one person put it: calculating 
one’s age at the time the foundation will close and wondering how 
welcoming the job market will be to someone at that age. Even then, 
however, the level of concern seems relatively low so far. As one per-
son noted, Atlantic has been a national leader in promoting “encore 
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careers” for older people who retire or find themselves stuck in a line 
of work that holds too little interest or opportunity for them. “For 
years, we’ve been telling the world that your older years are the per-
fect time to do something new, fulfilling, unprecedented. So guess 
what? A bunch of us will probably be proving it. Talk about walking 
the walk!”
The most pointed thought about the limitations of working at 
Atlantic tends to take place when some specific opportunity arises 
elsewhere. At that point, the staff member inevitably has to weigh 
that option in a way that people in other, more permanent organiza-
tions need not. One longtime employee tells a story that sheds light 
on this situation:
“A while ago I got a call from a head-hunter saying, ‘We’ve been given 
your name; we’d be really interested in your coming in to talk to us.’ 
The money was better than what I was earning here—and we’re paid 
very well compared to the foundation world. I turned that down, and 
I don’t regret that I turned it down at all. But I remember going home 
and telling my wife, saying ‘It was very nice,’ etc. And she said, ‘What 
did you say?’
“Then a month later [another possible position] came along, and a 
guy I know rang me up and said, ‘Listen, I think you’d be really good 
for this. And would you be interested?’ And more or less offered the 
job. I thought about it, and I turned it down, probably within a day. 
And I went back and told my wife, and that’s when she said, ‘Are you 
crazy? You’re in an organization that’s going out of business!’ Well, it 
wasn’t that I hadn’t thought about that. It’s just that I wouldn’t get to 
have this much interesting fun anywhere else. And it’s not just self-
indulgent fun. There are really important things happening here.”
This same employee notes, in a darkening tone, “As to whether I’ll 
still be here in 2016, I’d like to be. I like this organization, and I obvi-
ously like my job. But there is always the possibility that the decision 
won’t be mine. There’s always the possibility of being pushed. So in 
terms of what I’d like, yes, I’d like to be here till the end. But will I be? 
Probably not. I wouldn’t say the odds are any better than 50/50.”
Another staff member recalls being invited into a senior manager’s 
office some years ago and being told that managers were concerned 
about the prospect that this employee might be looking for more per-
manent work elsewhere. A long conversation ensued, the staff mem-
ber recalls, with amusement. “Afterward, I thought, ‘They’re joking, 
right? Where am I going to get another job like this one?’ But they 
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seemed to be genuinely worried, like they thought we were all going to 
be streaming out of here. And I think they were having conversations 
like this with other people.”
RETENTION AND REPLACEMENT: 
DIFFERING VIEWS
Worries about staff retention have, in fact, been genuine—at least 
among some senior managers and Trustees. Concerns about what 
some Trustees called “the human dimensions of the spend-down”12 
surfaced several times in Board minutes, mainly in the early years after 
the decision was first taken. But more recently, opinions on the subject 
have ranged widely. On one hand, as a manager put it in 2009, “We’ve 
organized these programs on an arc, and we’re approaching the top of 
that arc: the sensitive time when we start to determine what we’re go-
ing to concentrate on, what we’re going to wind down, how we move 
smoothly toward the conclusion. That’s not a time when you want to be 
bringing in a lot of new people. No matter how experienced and smart 
the new people are, they’re not going to have the feel of the program 
and the grantees to keep that arc smooth and productive. It’s just not 
a time when we want to be losing many senior people. So we need to 
make sure people feel secure here—within the limits we all recognize.” 
A Trustee concurred: ““We have always viewed the staff as a family, 
and we have obligations to one another. I can’t envision a day when 
we just send out pink slips and cardboard boxes, and just put people 
on the streets. That’s not going to happen. But if we expect people to 
stick with us, and accept a level of risk, putting their career decisions 
off a few more years and risking that they’ll get to the end without 
a concrete next step—well, we owe them some effort to make that 
worth their while. And to make sure they’re not on the sidewalk some-
day with no place to go next.” 
Human resources staff have, for some years, encouraged employees 
to formulate “development plans” for themselves, incorporating 
training, experience, and networking, among other things. Not all 
employees have taken up the challenge in a serious way, and recent 
budget cuts, resulting from the market crash, have reduced the op-
tions for foundation-supported training somewhat. But the emphasis 
on personal development plans continues—not only to ensure that 
no one ends up “on the sidewalk with no place to go,” but also to pro-
mote loyalty and morale, in an organization where upward mobility 
12. Minutes of the March 2003 Board meeting. 
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will necessarily be more limited than elsewhere. As a manager ex-
plained: “When we’re working hard to keep senior-level staff in place, 
and when all the jobs are going to disappear in a few years’ time, we 
can’t really offer junior employees a lot of hope of promotion within. 
Instead, they need to be thinking about how the skills they develop 
here will be useful to them on the outside.”
By contrast, another Trustee felt that the concern about loyalty and 
morale is at least partly exaggerated. This Board member argued 
that it is unrealistic, and in any event unnecessary, to expect senior 
staff members to stay at Atlantic longer than they might stay in an-
other foundation position. “This is a field where people tend to move 
around, and that’s fine. If you were at Ford or Gates or Robert Wood 
Johnson, and you’d already been there five years, how much longer 
would you expect to stay? We don’t need to be telling our people, ‘plan 
your careers differently, just because we’re spending down.’ If some-
one had a good opportunity and we discouraged them from taking it, 
I think that would be unfair and unwise.”
“On the program side,” said yet another Atlantic Trustee, “I really 
don’t worry about staffing at all. We’re a charitable organization, and 
charity begins at home—so yes, we’re generous with our staff, as we 
should be. And we care about people as individuals, which I believe 
we demonstrate in many, many ways. But there’s a tendency to get 
carried away and think we just can’t live without so-and-so. As de 
Gaulle said, the graveyards are full of indispensable people. When we 
get close to closing, there may be a few who will have an age problem, 
and we should think about that, especially about health benefits for 
people over a certain age. . . . But otherwise, if people think it’s in their 
best interest to leave, I don’t see any great cause for concern in that. 
In this field, it’s relatively easy to replace good people with exception-
ally good people. It’s a great job, working at a foundation.”
Some recent experience at other spend-down foundations bears 
out this view. For example, the Beldon Fund, which closed in 2009, 
reported toward the end of its life that “attracting talented profes-
sionals proved to be much easier than many outsiders might have 
expected. . . . Beldon was able to attract even better professionals—ad-
venturesome and creative—than it might have otherwise.” A veteran 
Atlantic employee essentially agreed: “I never saw myself as a lifer 
here. I frankly figured I’d be long gone by now. But in a funny way, the 
impact [the spend-down decision] had on me was to become much 
more energized, much more interested in seeing out the project and 
achieving something significant. The excitement of actually seeing 
something through is a fantastic motivator.”
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It’s significant that these views tend to come mostly from American 
Trustees and U.S.-based staff. Elsewhere, as Senior Vice-President 
Colin McCrea points out, “very few, if any, program staff leave Atlantic 
on their own accord, probably because there are very few foundations 
in these countries, and therefore opportunities to move do not exist.” 
A small number of non-U.S. employees did say they felt no anxiety 
about their eventual transition away from Atlantic. But these tended 
to be people whose careers had largely been made outside philanthro-
py, and who weren’t necessarily hoping for another foundation job. 
Among those outside the United States with long histories at Atlantic, 
however, future career planning could be more complicated. “In 
these countries,” Mr. McCrea adds, “being responsible to staff and 
ensuring that they do not end up on the sidewalk is more difficult, 
and helping them to move into employment other than foundation 
work will require a different approach.”
AN ISSUE FOR THE FUTURE
In any event, the discussion is almost entirely theoretical at this point. 
In nearly a score of interviews with current Atlantic staff, the prospect 
of leaving the foundation in the next year or two came up in only three 
cases. Not one of those had anything to do with the plan to spend 
down. Nor did any of these employees envision making a career deci-
sion based primarily on the fact that their jobs were time-limited—at 
least for now. “Maybe toward the end, I’ll start to feel the heat,” said 
one staffer. “But at this point, I give it pretty much zero thought.”
That pattern may change sooner than some employees believe, 
however. “Year after year,” said one anxious employee (who has no 
plans of leaving), “I ask at my personnel review: When are we being 
retrenched? And I never get an answer. There’s long-term financial 
planning that we need to do, both as programs and as individuals. 
Without sufficient information on where our future lies, the risk of 
losing staff gets bigger and bigger. But losing staff can be really dis-
ruptive, especially as time gets short. It takes a new staff member a 
year or more to get fully up to speed, so not only do you lose the ex-
perience and knowledge of a departing employee, you lose a year of 
productive time while a new employee, no matter how brilliant they 
are, gets acclimated. These are things we all worry about, but they’re 
just abstract concerns for the moment. They’re going to get a lot more 
concrete from now on.”
A manager acknowledged many of these same concerns, but envi-
sioned more of an emphasis on resolving them in the near future: 
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“It’s all about the timing. For the last few years, we’ve been mostly 
ramping up, on the program side. And when you’re ramping up, it’s 
very hard to think about shutting down. You notice in all the plan-
ning and strategic review that’s been going on, there hasn’t been a 
lot of discussion about closing anything out. It’s all very forward-
looking. . . . But given the economy, and just time marching on, we’re 
starting to get much clearer on where we are. Our dates are now 
much closer.”
“Even our wisest, most senior people,” this manager continued,  
“literally envisioned that because we were loyal to the mission, and we 
were so dedicated, that we would somehow all be staying right to the 
very last minute. We all picture our hands on the light-switch the day 
the lights go out. But little by little, reality is going to start sinking in, 
and I think you’ll see a subtle change in outlook over the next  
few years.”
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“This is not going to be an easy maneuver to pull off,” John R. Healy 
recalls telling the Trustees in mid-2005. “Because nobody’s done this 
at this scale.” As he started to reckon with how the various pieces 
of a gigantic spend-out effort would work together, Mr. Healy said 
years later, “we thought it would be an exercise in good management 
to start trying to think our way through how we do this.” He asked 
Deborah R. Phillips, now Atlantic’s executive vice-president and then 
the senior vice-president for non-program support services, to form a 
task force to draft a plan.
The difficulty Mr. Healy was referring to was not any single one of the 
challenges outlined in earlier sections of this report. Each of those, 
formidable as it may be, is governed by a professional discipline 
or body of practice in which similar problems have arisen before. 
Portfolios have been liquidated; philanthropic initiatives have drawn 
to a close; organizations and departments have closed shop and 
said farewell to their employees. But the complexity of distributing 
billions of dollars, winding down a staff of roughly 130 people, and 
accomplishing ambitious goals in four programs across seven coun-
tries—all on a single timeline now extending less than a decade  
into the future—was a combination of intertwining responsibilities 
on a scale, and at a pace, that no one in philanthropy had ever tack-
led before. 
The Beldon Fund, a U.S. environmental philanthropy that spent down 
its endowment in a decade, did tackle something similar, though 
on a smaller scale. The fund documented its spend-down process in 
detail, in a candid 2009 report that constitutes one of the few exten-
sive self-portraits of a foundation putting itself out of business. But 
Beldon was one-fortieth the size of Atlantic. At its peak, the Beldon 
staff numbered 15. The fund concentrated on a single policy area in a 
handful of U.S. states. Nonetheless, even on that much-smaller scale, 
5 .
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Beldon’s chief executive, Bill Roberts (who is now Atlantic’s director 
of U.S. advocacy), wrote in his retrospective report that the spend-
down was “akin to setting an airplane down on a narrow runway after 
a long flight.” Given Atlantic’s much-greater size, the analogy might 
be more like landing the Space Shuttle.
As Atlantic’s senior vice-president in charge of the various support 
functions—legal, financial, human resources, technology, and evalu-
ation, among other things—Deb Phillips had as broad a perspective 
on landing the aircraft as anyone other than Mr. Healy. The Spend-
Down Team she formed included representatives of all the support 
divisions under her direct supervision, plus one of the foundation’s 
four global program directors, Martin O’Brien, who oversees the 
Reconciliation and Human Rights program. The team met monthly 
by conference call, starting in May 2005.
Its first major effort was to come up with an interlocking set of plan-
ning modules, in which each of the foundation’s major functions 
would sketch out, on a summary chart, what they would try to achieve 
and what they would need from one another—in what sequence, 
under what assumptions by what time—in order to bring their work 
to a productive close in or around 2017. Within two months of start-
ing work, the team had created the first draft of a planning template 
on which the various divisions could lay out the major milestones in 
their expected life cycle and the main assumptions and objectives 
at each stage, then predict their resource needs and challenges over 
time. The template was synchronized with the life-cycle diagram that 
describes the expected ramp-up and wind-down of Atlantic’s opera-
tions (see page 8). 
By the early autumn of 2005, two support divisions had given the tem-
plate a trial run and produced completed versions. The remaining 
divisions, including all four of the programs, would perform a similar 
first-draft exercise in the next couple of months. In early 2006, the 
Team also reviewed the portfolio analysis and financial plan drafted 
by Atlantic’s investment team (see pages 12-13) and incorporated 
those projections into the planning timelines.
UNEXPECTED QUESTIONS  
AND CHALLENGES
The completed templates showed projected turning points in each 
program and division over the course of Atlantic’s remaining years, 
and suggested resources and adjustments that would be needed for 
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each. For example, Mr. O’Brien’s draft chart on the Reconciliation 
and Human Rights Program projected an increased need for support 
from the foundation’s Strategic Learning and Evaluation staff be-
tween 2009 and 2013, to help “distill and disseminate learning” from 
the first few years of steady-state grantmaking. It also foresaw a need 
for grants budget increases and additional staff skills in the final peri-
od, 2014-2018, to allow for the possibility of endowment grants. Other 
divisions went into even more detail—envisioning their response to 
significant changes in program structure, the closing of one or more 
country offices, or the result of a discouraging evaluation of some 
branch of activity.
The completed templates were frequently illuminating, if not always 
a clear guide to action. In this initial, rough phase, they proved to 
be more of a diagnostic tool—spotlighting issues that would prob-
ably arise and pinpointing the stages in which cross-departmental 
coordination would be critical—rather than a blueprint for how to 
address particular needs. As one division director pointed out, it was 
not always easy to distinguish activities that were specifically related 
to the spend-down process from those that were just the regular ebb-
and-flow of normal work. In fact, many of the needs and challenges 
noted on the initial templates were regular challenges that surface 
periodically in any foundation. Strategies always have to be adjusted; 
budgets revised; communications planned; evaluations completed. 
Are these spend-down issues, or just general management? In other 
words, it was not always easy to identify the boundary between the 
Spend-Down Team planning exercise and routine planning of all 
other kinds. Some members worried that, unless the boundaries were 
kept clear and firm, the team’s mission could easily have grown into 
something unmanageably broad—“a big, all-inclusive Plan to End All 
Plans,” as one person described it. 
But that was mainly a concern about later stages of effort. Most of 
the early questions on the team’s agenda were unmistakably linked 
to spend-down, but exactly how to answer them was less clear. For 
example, in a March 2006 discussion of the financial plan, the group 
concluded that a “discussion of and decision on endowments needs 
to be moved forward, and [program directors] need to start assessing 
the scope and need for endowments.” The question of endowments 
posed a possible challenge to the foundation’s steady-state financial 
model, which had long assumed that annual outlays and the overall 
scale of grantmaking were going to remain relatively flat until they 
dwindled in the final years. If, instead, there were to be late years of 
big, endowment-size terminal grants—as Mr. O’Brien’s hypotheti-
cal template speculated—then the grant budget might have to tick 
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upward in its penultimate stage, before the final wind-down. Unless 
today’s budgets were adjusted to make that feasible, there might not 
be enough money to allow for much discussion of endowments by the 
end of the program.
This was a potentially important question that directly challenged 
the (often unspoken) strategic and financial assumptions on which 
both the Board and management of Atlantic had been proceeding. “I 
would expect that in the last few years we may be endowing some of 
these organizations,” a Trustee said in the midst of one fairly typical 
discussion about the long-term survival of certain grantees. “But that 
will be up to the Board in the last two to four years.” Looking at the 
financial forecasts and thinking about program strategy, the Spend-
Down Team wondered, reasonably enough, whether the Board would 
have very many options left by those last two to four years, unless the 
list of options was deliberately widened now.
UNKNOWNS AND IMPONDERABLES
Several senior staff members agreed that such questions would be 
fundamental to any real spend-down planning, but acknowledged 
that the questions had yet to be directly confronted and resolved. Said 
one: “The ‘steady-state’ approach has always seemed so simple and 
reasonable that we haven’t really questioned it relative to what we 
want to achieve. Do we really want to spend the same amount year af-
ter year, and then just end? Maybe. But maybe we’ll want to husband 
some of the resources so that we can give some really major, life-
sustaining grants at the end, to the activities and organizations that 
we really think need to live on beyond us. Or maybe we don’t want to 
risk having a lot of money still on the books at the end, and we decide 
to rule out the big last-minute gifts. Maybe we’re going to come upon 
some really big opportunities sooner than the end, and we’ll want to 
reserve money for those in earlier years. I could make you a defense 
of any one of those choices. But they’re all different choices. And we 
haven’t really grappled with them.”
Nor did the Spend-Down team, working in mid-2006, see a clear way 
of grappling with them. For one thing, in 2006 the ramp-up phase for 
some of the programs was still under way or just ending. Most pro-
grams had not had enough time in “steady-state” operation to know 
whether some activities might later be worthy of greater effort, includ-
ing large terminal grants, or whether steady support might be the best 
approach all the way to the end. The team’s consensus, at that point, 
was that staff “will have more definitive information at the end of the 
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first five-year phase of steady-state grantmaking”13 with which to envi-
sion the later years of their plans. Until then, it seemed, discussions 
about endowments or other non-steady approaches to grantmaking 
were theoretically important but practically hard to resolve.
Another imponderable question was whether, or how, the founda-
tion might choose to end some of its program activities before the 
final stage of work starting in 2014. As a theoretical exercise, to envi-
sion how the various divisions would have to collaborate in response 
to such a decision, the team worked through two possible scenarios: 
one in which all four programs continued, largely intact, through the 
end, and another in which a sub-program was terminated in 2009 and 
a full program ended in 2011. In the latter case, the needs would in-
clude Human Resources services for departing or reassigned employ-
ees, re-budgeting of grant funds, well thought-out communications, 
and maybe the closing of a set of offices, depending on which activi-
ties might be terminated. Although the effort was purely hypothetical, 
it demonstrated how profoundly most divisions’ work would be af-
fected by an unexpected change in the trajectory of the programs dur-
ing the “steady-state” period.
Despite the many uncertainties, by the time John R. Healy stepped 
down as CEO at the end of 2006, the Spend-Down Team had synthe-
sized its various scenarios and templates and prepared a summary 
report to the Trustees for their December meeting. The summary 
outlined four phases of the foundation’s remaining life, with the par-
ticular functions and forms of expertise that would predominate in 
each stage:
(i) 2007 – 2011 – Emphasis on programme content exper-
tise, negotiation, due diligence, and monitoring skills.
(ii) 2012 – 2016 – Increased emphasis on evaluations, com-
munication, and ability to influence policy and nonprofit 
practice through dissemination of lessons.
(iii) 2017 – 2018 – Transition from active grantmaking to 
monitoring, communication, and dissemination.
(iv) 2019 -2020 – Provision of data, final evaluations and 
communication of lessons.14
The Board’s discussion of these phases, and of the fuller report that 
Dr. Phillips delivered to flesh them out, revealed a division of views 
13. Quotes about Spend-Down Team deliberations are taken from “Spend-Down Team 
Chronology,” an unpublished file document prepared by Deb Phillips, 2007.
14. From the minutes of the December 2006 Board meeting.
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that has persisted, both on and off the Board, ever since. On one 
hand, several Trustees cautioned against too detailed a planning ef-
fort at that stage, given that (a) a new CEO, Gara LaMarche, would 
soon take office and might want to adjust some of the underlying as-
sumptions behind any long-term plan; and (b) the progress of grant-
making in the next few years would surely change some of those as-
sumptions anyway, as the team itself had acknowledged. On the other 
hand, other Trustees cautioned against taking too leisurely an ap-
proach to mapping out the foundation’s remaining years. One Board 
member emphasized that the foundation’s spend-down schedule 
“is critical to grantees, goes to Atlantic’s credibility, and is important 
for addressing the internal resource challenges which will arise.” 
In the worst case, an ill-planned, abrupt, or hasty end to any line of 
grantmaking could have harmful effects on the grantees involved 
and would provoke broader anxieties among Atlantic’s staff and co-
funders. The consequences of haphazard action, according to this 
view, would be far worse than the problems that might be caused by 
excessive or premature planning.
Thinking about the debate some years later, a staff member put this 
latter idea in even starker terms: “Exiting programs and terminating 
people is not a bad thing to do, and if the institution is closing, it’s a 
necessity. But doing it with the appropriate bells and whistles for the 
person who’s going—doing it with enough lead-in time so they can 
make appropriate choices, and making sure that it’s communicated 
as to why decisions have been taken—that’s more than just a matter 
of being decent. Because otherwise people make up their own stories 
based on their own morbid fears. . . .  Now is the time that we really 
do need to start developing scenarios, working with staff to develop 
them, get some buy-in to the principles, and then share them. And 
then of course there has to be some executive latitude in terms  
of how those choices are implemented across the geographies and 
the programs.”
AN UNANNOUNCED PAUSE IN  
THE PLANNING REGIME
The arrival of Mr. LaMarche, and the strategic program review that 
he set in motion when he took office, soon made it clear that the for-
mer point of view, calling for a delay in spend-down planning, would 
prevail for the time being. As a staff member recalls, “Gara’s first 
concern, necessarily, was to get the programs tuned up, put his mark 
on them where he saw fit, and just make sure they were on a sound 
footing for the steady-state years, which were just beginning. To have 
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carried on a simultaneous planning process dealing how all these 
things would end—while we were still examining what these things 
were going to look like and how they were going to be managed for 
the next ten years—might not have done any particular harm, but 
it would have been a waste of time. And the effort involved in this 
spend-down planning was considerable. People had other things, 
higher priorities, they needed to be concentrating on at that point.”
Members of the Spend-Down team essentially agreed, though some 
imagined that they might “regroup,” as one document put it, and ap-
proach the planning exercise in a new way. That has not happened 
thus far. Instead, the December 2006 report to the Board was the 
group’s last official act, although it met once or twice more at the be-
ginning of 2007. It has remained in a kind of suspended animation 
ever since—“not dead exactly, but kind of a Sleeping Beauty,” as one 
observer put it. After this two-year hiatus, a senior staff member in 
2009 predicted that the exercise would soon be resumed, in a differ-
ent form, now that the program reviews were complete. “The Spend-
Down Team did a lot of extremely valuable work. We’re now going to 
have to pick it up again, and a lot of what they came up with we’ll be 
able to update and resume work on.”
Yet the suspension in spend-down planning was also a lesson in the 
importance of communication in the midst of uncertainty. Time after 
time, in interviews for this report, Atlantic employees would assert 
with confidence that a Spend-Down Team was resolving this or that 
important issue, and that decisions from the team might be immi-
nent. The mistaken belief that important deliberations were under 
way about the future of the programs and their personnel had both 
comforting and disquieting effects on staff members, depending on 
the issue under discussion. 
On the positive side, for example, one program staffer looked forward 
to the clarity he believed would soon come from a Spend-Down Team 
report: “I’ve heard variously that the final date will be 2016 or some-
thing like that. And beyond that it would just be tail [i.e., the final 
stream of payments on grants already committed]. Now, I’m not sure 
where I’ve heard that, and I haven’t seen a document about it. But as-
suming it’s true, that’s just seven or eight years from now. There’s a 
Spend-Down Committee that’s working through all that, and when they 
lay it out, I think that will have a galvanizing effect on all of us. It almost 
sounds trite to say it, but psychologically, you never quite believe it [that 
the foundation is going to close]. The internalization of that is quite 
important. But spend-down is not something that’s really discussed 
around here at all. The spend-down plan will change that, for sure.”
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A few employees, though, seemed to worry that the team might be 
making fateful decisions somewhere in secret, without enough par-
ticipation by the broader staff. Some members of the program staff 
expressed discomfort with the fact that every support division was 
represented on the team, but only one of four program directors was 
a member. “Is this a case of the tail wagging the dog?” one person 
asked in 2009, plainly under the impression that the dog and its tail 
were still in motion. Another employee, a former Spend-Down Team 
member, reported hearing concerns from colleagues that the draft 
planning modules seemed to put too much emphasis on the results 
of outside evaluations as a prime determinant of which programs 
would last and which would be wound down early. (The role of evalua-
tions in weighing end-dates was, in fact, the subject of spirited discus-
sion on the team, but the issue was never resolved.)
Another staffer summed up the lingering anxieties by asking, “What 
is the Spend-Down Team up to? They meet every month” (note that 
this comment came more than two years after the group had stopped 
meeting), “but we don’t ever see any reports. Some of us wonder if 
they’re making judgments about programs and who stays and who 
goes, or if they’re going to come out with some big announcement 
some day that will take us all by surprise. I hope not, but frankly I have 
no idea.” 
Most employees dismissed or suppressed such concerns for now, ex-
pressing confidence that the Board and management could be relied 
on to carry out an inclusive, open process. Indeed, even the employee 
who asked what the Spend-Down Team was up to hastened to add, 
“Don’t get me wrong. There’s a partnership here, and we feel it. We’re 
not getting a lot of answers, but we’re also not pushing for them yet.” 
Another staff member concurred: “As far as I know, the process [of 
making firm decisions about spend-down] isn’t happening yet, but I 
do hope it starts happening soon.”
Among grantees, likewise, a lack of clear information on how spend-
down decisions will be reached and promulgated has prompted some 
speculation and uncertainty. “Atlantic doesn’t talk to us about the 
funding context,” said a senior officer of one longtime grantee. He ex-
plained that an Atlantic program executive “told us that there are $13 
million in grants that were being planned [in this grantee’s field] and 
only $8 million available. But of course, in this economy, we’ve been 
hearing that from every foundation. But there’s been no information 
on whether this docket area [i.e., the Atlantic program under which 
the grantee is funded] is going to continue, or at what level. Is this an 
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area they’re going to tie off before the end? Or is this one of their top 
priorities? Whether this is going to expand, or contract, or end sooner 
than others, or change focus—I have no idea. I understand there’s an 
internal group working on those kinds of plans, so maybe these are 
all things we’ll be learning more about.”
As this is written, that hope seems likely to be fulfilled in the next year 
or two. In June 2009, Marcia Smith, who had become Atlantic’s senior 
vice president for programs just over a year earlier, offered the Board 
a new framework for spend-down planning, which would start later 
that same year. The structure and process for the resumed planning 
effort is still under discussion as this is written. But the foundation 
has resolved, as one manager put it, “to have, in the next year or so, 
a plan for how the [program] work will proceed, how it will narrow 
toward the later years, and how the work, the goals of our work, will 
drive all the other organizational functions toward that end. That’s 
a little different from the way it was done in the earlier round, where 
the focus was more on the organizational functions. But from here 
on, the focus is going to be on the work, how we want it to end, what 
we want it to accomplish, and then plan around how we get there with 
all the resources and activities of the foundation pulling together.” 
“It’s not overdue,” this manager concluded. “But it’s time now for 
this. We all realize that we need to have a framework that’s a little 
more articulate than we have had. And if we don’t make progress on 
that in the next year or so, I think it’ll be costly to us in terms of our 
ability to get the best out of the next five, six, seven years.”
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In 2005, in her year-end presentation to the Atlantic Board on spend-
down planning, Deb Phillips included a slide that broadened her 
message beyond the routine matters of budgets, timelines, and man-
agement integration. “One way or another,” the slide began, “we will 
be telling a story to the world.” 
Dr. Phillips reminded the Trustees of a point that several of them 
had made in the past: Atlantic’s experience in spending out its huge 
portfolio would inevitably be a test case for other philanthropists and 
foundation boards. Setting an encouraging example—demonstrat-
ing, in effect, the advantages of Giving While Living—was part of the 
rationale for spending down. Conducting the process thoughtfully 
was therefore not only a management responsibility; it was a philan-
thropic goal, integral to the foundation’s mission. 
This report, together with its successor documents in future years, 
is aimed at helping to tell the story and to distill lessons from it that 
may be useful to others. From the experience thus far, the following 
five principles emerge, at least in tentative form. For now, they should 
be taken as working hypotheses, although all of them are well sup-
ported by the evidence of the first eight years. 
1.	 The	decision	about	whether	to	spend	down	is	neither	scientific	
nor	readily	resolved	with	evidence	and	metrics	alone.	It	is	
primarily	a	matter	of	principle	and	conviction.		
Some rationales for spend-down are, it’s true, based on mostly logi-
cal, strategic calculations—for example, if the foundation is working 
on a problem that can or must be solved in the near term, and for 
which an all-out, present-tense assault offers the best hope of suc-
cess. But Atlantic did not take this approach. Instead, it tended to 
6.
CONCLUSION
BEGINNING TO TELL 
“A STORY TO THE WORLD”
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pursue philanthropic interests in which it had already made grants 
and had accumulated some field experience, even though the issues 
were not of the now-or-never variety. In some cases, Atlantic affirma-
tively chose not to pursue issues, such as global warming, that might 
arguably have called for seizing the moment now rather than later. 
(To be sure, the foundation has occasionally made big, concentrated, 
short-term investments in immediate challenges, such as peace in 
Northern Ireland and health-care reform in the United States. But 
these have mostly stood out as exceptions to a rule in which the foun-
dation’s largest, most sustained interests have focused on long-term 
problems like health, aging, and child poverty.) 
For the most part, Atlantic’s reasons for spending down could apply 
just as well to many other philanthropists and foundations, whatever 
their particular charitable interests. These are, first, a desire to see 
the effects of its investments in real time; second, a belief that the 
foundation would realize more social benefit with a large present-day 
investment than with smaller payments made in perpetuity; third, a 
suspicion that perpetual foundations tend to founder or stray from 
their missions; and last, a confidence that other philanthropists will 
come along in the future to replace Atlantic’s contributions—and 
might even be more encouraged to do so by Atlantic’s having set an 
example of the joy of “Giving While Living.” The fact that these ideas 
are not specific to Atlantic’s charitable interests or endowment size 
is part of what makes them important. Serving as a model for other 
similar-minded institutions—no matter their scale or mission—is an 
express part of Atlantic’s vision for spending down.
Admittedly, none of these tenets is provable. Some of them are vig-
orously debated, both inside and outside of philanthropy. But all of 
them represent beliefs deeply held by Mr. Feeney and, to a consider-
able extent, by the other Atlantic Trustees. Because philanthropy is 
first of all an expression of the heart and the conscience, such unprov-
able but compelling beliefs are critically important in motivating peo-
ple to give. And the fact that Atlantic’s tenets are both defensible and 
widely shared makes them likely to motivate other wealthy people to 
plunge more enthusiastically into philanthropy. That is, in itself, a 
strategic goal dear to Mr. Feeney and the Board, and thus a convincing 
rationale for spending down.
2.	 A	spend-down	investment	portfolio	is	fundamentally	different	
from	a	perpetual	portfolio	and	poses	a	distinct	set	of	questions	
and	challenges.	
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Above all, the need to preserve enough capital to last reliably for the 
full planned life of the institution has to be balanced against the need 
to have sufficient liquidity, year by year, to meet grant obligations 
and to allow for a smooth flow of new grant commitments. This is 
true regardless of whether the foundation chooses to make grants, as 
Atlantic has, in a “steady state” of roughly equal commitments year 
after year, or whether it plans for a burst of big grants early or late in 
its life. Either way, the portfolio needs to limit volatility and provide 
predictable liquidity in whatever pattern the foundation chooses for 
its lifespan. This means, of course, that the foundation must decide, 
relatively early, what its grantmaking pattern is going to be, based on 
its philanthropic goals and assessment of needs. That pattern then 
must inform the portfolio planning and management. And both must 
be revisited regularly—at least annually, and more often when mar-
kets or philanthropic plans are in flux. 
3.	 For	a	time,	maybe	even	a	long	time,	spend-down	grantmaking	
can	be	indistinguishable	from	perpetual	grantmaking,	except	for	
the	size	of	the	grant	awards.	But	eventually	the	two	models	will	
have	to	diverge.	
In two successive rounds of strategic planning, Atlantic’s program 
staff produced detailed papers on their programs that scarcely men-
tioned the foundation’s planned conclusion. Three of the strategy 
documents were widely praised by Trustees and staff alike (the 
fourth, on Disadvantaged Children and Youth, was still being com-
pleted as this was written). Yet these documents could have been 
written in almost identical terms if Atlantic were planning to operate 
in perpetuity, a fact that most program staff and managers freely ac-
knowledged. The overriding concern in all of the strategy documents 
was not the challenge of arriving at a proximate end date with a pre-
determined result, but the challenge of focusing activity, defining 
specific goals, matching broad philanthropic visions to the particu-
lar needs of individual countries and populations, and most of all the 
achievement of “impact”—generally defined as significant, measur-
able results commensurate with the size of the foundation’s invest-
ment. But challenges of those kinds run through the work of nearly 
all the most strategic foundations, including the majority that intend 
to stay in business indefinitely. 
Still, many observers believe strongly that in the background, and 
in their underlying logic, these papers are direct expressions of 
Atlantic’s spend-down mentality, even if they don’t express it in so 
many words. The comparatively small number of initiatives, the 
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emphasis on visible near-term results, and the increasing focus on 
systemic and public-policy change all express an escalating urgency, 
a sense of needing, as one manager put it, “to change the game fun-
damentally before we’re done.” There is, in other words, a tendency 
toward boldness and a suggestion of legacy that characterizes each 
of the plans, even in the absence of any discussion about how these 
efforts will end. “In most of the areas where we work,” one program 
staffer said, “you would see a more deliberate, experimental approach 
to these issues if we were going to be around for another 20 years. 
We’d probably be trying more things; we might be doing more direct 
service, learning at the front lines to try and gather new ideas—a lot 
of things aimed at learning and advancing the needle little by little. 
Those are all things that time can buy you. With spend-down, you get 
the kinds of strategies that concentrate on making big impact in a few 
areas with really high-yield approaches.”
That point of view is widely held at Atlantic, though observers at some 
other foundations would probably dispute it. It’s rare for programs 
at any foundation to last any longer than Atlantic’s programs will 
last. Most foundations try (albeit with uneven success) to be bold, to 
change the game, to make a big impact. Some initiatives, of course, 
are intentionally modest and aimed more at learning than immediate 
results. Others end up appearing modest when viewed in hindsight, 
whatever their original ambition may have been. But it’s a rare foun-
dation that intentionally designs programs without aiming boldly at a 
high and measurable yield in public benefit. 
For now, the most visible difference between Atlantic’s grantmaking 
and that of the best perpetual foundations is the increasingly tight 
boundaries Atlantic has placed around its fields of activity, with un-
commonly large percentages of its resources concentrated on just a 
few lines of work. The Trustees and management have resisted pres-
sures to expand the menu of program activities and geographic lo-
cales, and the latest round of strategic review has drawn an even tight-
er rein on the scope of work. As a result, more money is dedicated to 
fewer things, while a strategic “Venture Fund” preserves the flexibility 
to seize significant opportunities that might emerge outside these few 
regular fields of interest.
Focus and scale of grantmaking are therefore the two features that 
most set Atlantic’s work apart from perpetual foundations—for now. 
But with roughly eight years left of active grantmaking (not counting 
the lingering tail of grant payments that will follow the final year), the 
difference between Atlantic and its perpetual brethren is likely to be-
come much more pronounced. Grantees in some fields and countries 
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are already beginning to plan a profoundly altered future without 
Atlantic. Program staff are increasingly engaged in wooing other 
sources of funding for their programs. More and more grants aim at 
helping recipient organizations redouble their fundraising efforts. 
Planning exercises like the one with South Africa’s gay and lesbian 
organizations—in which grantees collectively map out the future of 
their fields and the pursuit of their long-term goals after Atlantic’s de-
parture—seem likely to become more common. Atlantic staff increas-
ingly talk about sifting the sustainable goals from those that must be 
achieved now or else be abandoned. As each year goes by, the nature 
of Atlantic’s program activities are sure to become more distinguish-
able, both in form and intent, from those of perpetual foundations.
At this point, however, the most interesting observation is how long 
the foundation has been able to operate high-quality programs 
without dwelling much—at least on the surface—on the nuts and 
bolts of spending down. “It may very well be,” a senior Atlantic staff 
member said, “that most of the time, the day-to-day life and thinking 
and grantmaking of large institutions that are trying to effect social 
change is not materially different between a foundation that’s going 
to go on forever and one that isn’t. No matter how hard you try to keep 
that frame in view, it doesn’t really change your existence that much. 
I’m not sure that’s true, but it may be. Obviously, toward the end, it 
has to change. The day will come when it really has to change.” 
4.	 Although	a	spend-down	foundation	can’t	offer	the	prospect	of	
long-term	employment	as	a	way	of	recruiting,	retaining,	and	
motivating	staff,	this	has	not	posed	much	of	a	problem	at	Atlantic	
so	far.	It	is	too	soon	to	tell,	though,	whether	defections	and	
declining	morale	may	become	more	serious	problems	as	the	end	
date	draws	nearer.
With rare exceptions, current employees at Atlantic think about the 
eventual disappearance of their jobs with little more than a shrug. 
Some middle-aged staffers acknowledge nagging concerns about the 
timing of their departure—particularly about the prospect of look-
ing for a new job in seven or eight years’ time, with just a few years to 
go before retirement. But these fears seem to lurk in the background 
for the time being, overshadowed by the satisfactions of their current 
work and the material and professional advantages of being associat-
ed with Atlantic.  Both younger employees and those reasonably close 
to retirement tend to cite the prospect of a spend-down as a plus: It 
offers a chance for invigorating, high-stakes work on which to build 
or conclude a philanthropic career. The experience of the Beldon 
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Foundation and others suggests that these same feelings might help 
in attracting first-rate new staff when some current employees inevi-
tably leave.
Still, Atlantic has taken pains to encourage many key employees to 
stay motivated, if not all the way to the end, at least until activity be-
gins to diminish. Some staff and managers are concerned that un-
planned vacancies could be especially disruptive in the later years, 
when important work arrives at a sensitive, succeed-or-fail stage 
and there is no time for a learning curve. At the same time, Human 
Resources staff have also begun encouraging employees to think 
about their post-Atlantic careers well in advance of the end, and to 
pursue education or training opportunities that will make the transi-
tion easier when their time at the foundation is done.
At this point, however, these issues are largely simmering on a back 
burner. With no visible signs of mass departure or sagging morale any 
time soon, most people tend to regard spend-down as, at most, a pos-
sible source of future personnel concerns. But they are not immediate 
ones—and may not be very grave ones even in the longer run.
5.	 Spending	down	wisely	entails	a	careful	orchestration	of	all	the	
talents	of	the	foundation,	working	toward	the	same	goals	on	
the	same	schedule.	Planning	and	executing	that	team	effort—
so	that	employees,	grantees,	and	co-funders	are	prepared	and	
understand	how	the	process	is	unfolding—will	be	difficult	and	
time-consuming	work	that	needs	to	start	soon.
Especially as the time gets shorter, wrapping up a large and compli-
cated philanthropic program is going to involve the deliberate inter-
weaving of many divisions and disciplines: deft financial manage-
ment and budgeting to ensure funds are available when needed; as-
tute Human Resources management to maintain the necessary work-
force and preserve morale; well-executed program strategy to produce 
results on an approaching deadline; thoughtful communications and 
knowledge management to collect and share whatever is learned; 
and a thicket of sensitive executive decisions about what functions to 
shrink or wind down, in what order, by what date. It is unlikely that all 
of these will interact with clockwork precision, but the challenge does 
have some things in common with precision engineering. 
The alternative, a haphazard or uncoordinated conclusion, is not a 
prospect that many people on the Atlantic staff or Board consider 
at all likely. The organization has a long history of planning and 
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executing organizational changes, and managers point out that, in 
many ways, the spend-down is just another organizational change 
(though admittedly one with little room for error). The skill and orga-
nizational structure needed to plan a smooth, well-coordinated con-
clusion are already in place. All that’s needed, most agree, is that the 
process begin early enough, and proceed openly enough, to inspire 
confidence and invite broad participation. The time for that, manag-
ers believe, is now, and they expect the process to be well under way in 
2010, at least seven years before the end. 
“People will need to know that the spend-down process is ‘under 
management,’” Deb Phillips wrote in a memo to Atlantic’s senior 
management in early 2005, when the original Spend-Down Team was 
about to be formed. “Otherwise, perceived uncertainty and ambiguity 
will distract them from doing the work required.  We will need to de-
velop and communicate a clear image of the future state at Atlantic, 
use internal teams to carry out specific tasks, and communicate in the 
right way the overall plan for spend-down.”
For now, the end of the Atlantic Philanthropies is largely an abstrac-
tion to most people in and outside the organization—even, to some ex-
tent, to grantees whose most important funder will be gone before the 
next decade is over. As the head of one signature Atlantic grantee or-
ganization put it, “we know this is a big issue, and we’ve been taking a 
lot of steps, most of them with Atlantic support, to prepare for it. We’re 
being responsible about it, and we’re actually making more progress 
finding other sources of funding than we had expected at this point. 
But I couldn’t honestly say it’s something we think about all the time, 
or that’s really impacting our day-to-day work in the here-and-now. It’s 
something we know is out there in the future. But most nonprofits live 
in two- or three-year time horizons, and we’re pretty much the same. 
A lot of things in our world will be profoundly different by the time we 
have to face the end of Atlantic’s support, and we can’t spend all our 
time pondering what the future of 2020 is going to look like.” 
Nearly all the Atlantic employees interviewed for this report voiced 
similar sentiments. Some were more concerned than others about 
how the spend-down would proceed, how decisions would be made, 
how those decisions would affect their work, and even (to a very lim-
ited degree) how the progress of the spend-down might affect their 
own careers. Several foresaw a time, not far away, when these ques-
tions would have to be answered, and when the answers would have 
an important effect on employees’ lives. But that reality, for nearly 
everyone, still lay comfortably in the future—albeit a future that most 
hoped would be no more than a year or two away. 
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The resumption of a spend-down planning regimen in 2010 is now 
a near-certainty. When that begins in earnest, much of the abstrac-
tion will start taking on the weight and mass of tangible reality. At 
that point, as one Atlantic manager put it, “we’ll probably sense a 
subtle shift toward thinking again about legacy and what we’re going 
to leave behind, and about how all this work is going to tie up. Those 
things have always been in the background of every important conver-
sation. It’s not like they’re new. But they’re going to start coming into 
the foreground. And that’s when it’s going to get interesting.”
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1982   
MARCH 1 The	Atlantic	Foundation	formally	established in 
Bermuda with an initial gift of $5 million. Harvey Dale 
becomes the first CEO. All grants are made anonymous-
ly, a strictly enforced policy that will continue until the 
end of 2001.
1984   
NOV. 23 					 The	Atlantic	Foundation	acquires	Mr.	Feeney’s	complete	
stake	in	Duty	Free	Shoppers	(DFS), consisting of 38.75 
percent of the company, together with other assets. 
1986   
	 	 The	Atlantic	Trust	formally	established, also in Bermuda, 
to handle U.S. giving. 
1996   
OCT. 1 Atlantic	shares	in	DFS	sold to European retail company 
LVMH. The sale brings Atlantic’s total endowment to 
$3.5 billion.
1999   
OCT. 13 	 For	the	first	time,	Mr.	Feeney	gives	the	Board	formal	no-
tice	that	he	would	prefer	to	spend	down. At a meeting at 
the Cornell Club in New York, he presents a 200-word 
memo on the subject of legacy. He notes that annual giv-
ing will reach $400 million that year alone, a level that, 
if sustained, will eventually spend out the endowment. 
He proposes that grantmaking be increased to $450 
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million a year, well over 10 percent of assets, and asks 
that Trustees consider a life span of 20 to 30 years for the 
foundation. The Board agrees in principle. 
2001   
SEPT. 1 		 John	R.	Healy	succeeds	Harvey	Dale	as	CEO. He finds a 
“common understanding,” though without any formal 
decision, that the foundation will spend down its endow-
ment in approximately 15 years. 
	 	 The	Atlantic	Foundation	and	Atlantic	Trust	become	
The	Atlantic	Philanthropies;	the	policy	of	anonymous	
grantmaking	ends;	the	Board	signals	a	decision	to	spend	
down.	An unpublished year-end report says that “prepa-
ratory work was done which led to the Board’s signaling 
to the organization at large that the life of Atlantic would 
be limited and that its array of programs might be sig-
nificantly changed.”
2002   
JAN. 29 	 Trustees hold workshop on a revised grantmaking 
program for the foundation’s remaining life. Trustees 
tentatively select six program areas for further explora-
tion, with the expectation that the list would eventually 
be shortened. Grant budget is set at $400 a year and the 
sunset is tentatively set at no earlier than 2016. Mr. Healy 
begins raising with the Trustees some practical conse-
quences of the spend-down decision, particularly in rela-
tion to investment management and human resources.
JUNE Market	downturn	plus	large	payouts	reduce	available	
funding. Chief Investment Officer David. Erskine in-
forms the Atlantic Governance Committee that “the 
portfolio’s negative absolute return means the value 
of the endowment is decreasing rapidly.” He warns of 
the possibility that continued declines in the endow-
ment’s value, due to market conditions and large pay-
outs, could limit Atlantic’s ability to reach its targeted 
end date. Mr. Healy and several Trustees urge that the 
Board take care not to shorten the foundation’s planned 
lifespan, because it will take close to 15 years to choose, 
build, implement, and exit programs in a way that is 
likely to make a lasting difference. 
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	 	 Trustees	agree	to	lower	payout	temporarily. The Board 
instructs Mr. Healy to set a lower level of grantmaking 
over the next two to three years and to keep the Board in-
formed of the consequences.
SEPT. The Wall Street Journal breaks	the	story	of	Atlantic’s	
spend-down. “Earlier this year,” the paper reports, 
“Mr. Feeney pushed his foundation, the Atlantic 
Philanthropies, to adopt a plan to exhaust its $4 bil-
lion endowment over 15 years or so. Now 70 years old, 
Mr. Feeney told his Board that the prospect of going 
out of business would focus the foundation on bold 
problem-solving rather than self-perpetuation. The foun-
dation, which approved about $100 million in grants 
in 1995, will now give away roughly $400 million each 
year. . . . That puts the Atlantic Philanthropies, which un-
til last year made nearly all of its grants anonymously, in 
the top ranks of private givers.” . . . 
	 	 Endowment	spend-down	tracking	added	to	the	manage-
ment	dashboard. An online chart begins presenting a 
quarterly picture of the impact of existing and assumed 
future commitments on the endowment. 
  Grant	budgets	projected	for	2003-2005,	followed	by	a	
“steady	state”	in	2006	and	onward.  Commitment levels 
estimated at $250 million in 2003, $200 million in 2004 
and 2005 and $400 million in 2006 and onwards. Given 
the effect on Atlantic’s endowment of the bear market 
of 2000-2003, combined with high levels of grant com-
mitments, Mr. Healy recommends a slower pace of com-
mitments over the next three years, to pave the way for “a 
steady slope into the 15-year spend-down.”
2003   
FEB. 	 CEO’s	annual	report	describes	2002	as	“a	year	of	mo-
mentous	change,”	noting that the Board had taken “the 
fundamental decision that Atlantic would spend down 
its endowment over the coming twelve to fifteen years.”
MARCH 	 Statement	of	‘Legacy	and	Purpose’	formally	adopted,	
spelling	out	a	mission,	legacy	goals,	and	core	values	
for	the	foundation. The Board adopts as Atlantic’s mis-
sion the statement’s call “to make lasting changes that 
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will improve the lives of disadvantaged and vulnerable 
people.” The statement also enunciates a “guiding prin-
ciple” to “demonstrate the value and benefits of Giving 
While Living.”
	 	 Spending	levels	in	2003	cause	concern. Trustees discuss 
the possible impacts of larger-than-forecast grant com-
mitments being paid during the 2003 calendar year, in 
the midst of still-unsettled market conditions. 
	 	 Trustees	express	concern	about	effect	of	spend-down	
on	staffing	and	morale.	Mr. Healy agrees and invites the 
Board to join in “thinking about and planning for the hu-
man dimension of the spend down.”
OCT. 	 Endowment	and	payout	picture	improves. Improved 
market conditions ensure that the endowment will be 
able to cover current expected payouts. Trustees revise 
future commitment budgets downward to $200 million, 
$250 million, $300 million, and $350 million respectively 
over the next four years.
	 	 New	investment	strategy	adopted,	relying	on	increased	
certainty	and	return	level. To achieve lower volatility with 
high returns, the Board approves a staff recommenda-
tion of reduced exposure to equities and adoption of “an 
absolute return strategy using a variety of techniques, 
primarily through hedge fund vehicles.”
2004   
FEB. 	 CEO’s	year-end	report	notes	that	2003	saw	the	imple-
mentation	of	Atlantic’s	new	program	structure,	orga-
nized around four program themes: Children and Youth, 
Aging, Health, and Human Rights. 
2005   
MARCH 	 Mr.	Healy	initiates	a	new	effort	to	plan	and	coordinate	
activities	for	spend-down, encompassing financial man-
agement, human resources, communications, strategic 
learning, and program strategy. He asks Senior Vice 
President Deb Phillips to convene a staff-level Spend 
Down Team to coordinate the planning process. The 
team holds its first meeting in May.
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JUNE 	 Trustees	express	renewed	concern	about	the	level	of	an-
nual	commitments	relative	to	targets.	Some Trustees 
foresee a need to trim budgets or the scope of program 
activity to keep spending in line with projections. Others 
warn that large early commitments drain funds from 
future grantmaking, which could lead to the foundation 
giving away significantly less, over its lifetime, than had 
originally been planned.	Mr. Healy promises an analysis 
and options for the Board’s consideration later in the 
year.	
SEPT. 	 Mr.	Healy	and	Chief	Investment	Officer	Philip	Coates	
present	analysis	of	portfolio	performance	and	recom-
mendations	on	future	spending.	Recommendations in-
clude restraint on future commitments to ensure a pre-
dictable “steady-state” grant budget for ten more years 
and the ability to wind down the program responsibly 
thereafter. Some Trustees, however, express a counter-
vailing concern that grant outlays in some years may not 
be large enough to meet the “steady-state” target of $350 
million annually, adjusted for inflation. Falling short of 
the target, they warn, would prolong the foundation’s 
life beyond the spend-down schedule. After discussion, 
the Board decides that the risk of overspending is greater 
than that of underspending, and approves the recom-
mended restraint.
	 	 Deb	Phillips	reports	to	Trustees	on	the	progress	of	the	
Spend-Down	Team. The team’s goals, she says, include 
ensuring transparency and broad engagement of the 
staff in planning the spend-down, and ensuring that 
staff are prepared, personally and professionally, for the 
consequences.
2006
MARCH Consultants from McKinsey & Co. submit a report 
titled “Strategic Change at the Atlantic Philanthropies: 
Lessons from a Six-Year Journey, 1999-2005,” describing 
the major changes in foundation management, program, 
and planning since the earliest discussions about spend-
ing down. The first lesson in the report’s concluding 
section is that “A spend-down decision creates an insti-
tution-wide focus on legacy and outcomes that enables 
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the foundation to fundamentally change its strategy and 
operations in a relatively short period of time.” The deci-
sion to spend down, the report continued, “increased 
the Board’s engagement, sharpened the organization-
wide focus on impact, and raised the energy level among 
staff.” In oral remarks, one of the authors expresses a 
judgment that the decision to spend down had “galva-
nized the organization and generated a profound discus-
sion about impact that other foundations do not have.” 
MAY 	 John	R.	Healy	announces	retirement as CEO.
DEC. 	 Gara	LaMarche	announced	as	new	CEO; will take office 
effective April 2007.
  Deb	Phillips	gives	the	Board	a	year-end	report	on	the	
Spend-Down	Team, including a timeframe showing the 
progress of the spend-down in four phases, through 
2020, describing the issues and questions that predomi-
nate during each phase. Some Trustees caution, how-
ever, that the new CEO may wish to revise some of the 
underlying assumptions. They recommend a slower pace 
for the time being, while noting that planning is essen-
tial and should resume in earnest after the leadership 
transition.
2007   
	 	 Gara	LaMarche	succeeds	John	R.	Healy	as	CEO; strong 
market brings endowment value to $4 billion despite 
sharp rise in total giving. 
DEC. Investment	Committee	Reviews	Financial	Framework	
for	Spend-Down. Philip Coates presents a memoran-
dum, “A Framework for Spend-Down” to the Investment 
Committee, detailing a “philosophical approach” to the 
management of assets for spend-down, and a further 
elaboration of options for balancing the endowment 
plus returns against grants plus operating costs. 
	 	 Mr.	LaMarche	submits	to	the	Board	a	paper	titled	“Focus,	
Impact,	and	Legacy,” discussing his vision of the pro-
gram implications of spend-down. The paper describes 
the beginning of a new round of strategic review for all 
programs and geographies that will lead to a tighter 
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focus in each program area, together with greater atten-
tion to defining and achieving a legacy within the foun-
dation’s remaining lifespan.
SEPT. Trustee Harvey Dale submits a memo to the Investment 
Committee titled “Exogenous AP,” “intended to stimu-
late possible rethinking of the boundary conditions for 
the AP portfolio,” but also noting that the ideas in the 
memo have “potentially more significant HR and pro-
gram implications.” The memo recommends not think-
ing of Atlantic’s assets as something that will be liqui-
dated and spent “before we ‘turn off the lights.’ ” Rather, 
he writes, financial assets—and also personnel and pro-
gram work—could be transferred to other institutions 
that would continue to use them to pursue Atlantic’s 
goals. Many financial assets, he suggests, could be better 
managed, for greater return, if they were not constrained 
by a need to liquidate them to meet a fixed end-date.
2008   
JUNE Mr.	LaMarche	submits	a	paper	titled	“The	End	of	Atlantic	
as	We	Know	It:	Time	to	Start	Thinking	and	Planning,”	
giving further detail, program-by-program, on what 
spend-down would mean and what it might achieve. 
The paper seeks to “imagine the end of Atlantic”—i.e., 
the things the foundation might hope to achieve by the 
time the programs are concluded—“and work back from 
there.” The paper posits a tentative final set of commit-
ments at the end of 2017 and describes the grantmaking 
effort in each country and program that would be needed 
to achieve a significant legacy.
SEPT.  Mr.	LaMarche	circulates	a	statement	titled	“Social	
Justice	as	a	Framework	for	Atlantic’s	Programmes,” 
describing a unifying theme of Atlantic’s grantmaking, 
showing how it applies in each of the four program ar-
eas, and drawing implications for Atlantic’s geographic 
centers of activity. Although the paper does not focus on 
spend-down, it notes that “one of the defining character-
istics of a social-justice frame is its emphasis on systemic 
change. . . . [I]t is often the surest route to achieving the 
lasting change we want to see.” 
NOV. 	 David	Sternlieb	and	David	Walsh	prepare	an	analysis	
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titled	“Spend-Down:	The	Sustainability	Challenge,” 
which “seeks to gauge the risk to grantee survival pre-
sented by our spend-down.” It argues for “extending 
sustainability planning beyond a piecemeal, grantee-by-
grantee context and making it integral to our program 
and organizational strategies.” Among nine recommen-
dations, the memo advises concentrating on “objectives 
that do not depend on grantee sustainability” and cau-
tions against “increasing the number and size of grant-
ees beyond the point where they are sustainable by post-
Atlantic funding sources.” 
2009   
JUNE 	 Marcia	Smith,	senior	vice-president	for	programs,	
reports	to	the	Board	the	beginning	of	a	new	process		
and	structure	for	spend-down	planning,	aimed at 
mapping out the later years of program activity and 
coordinating the various aspects of the foundation’s 
work to ensure success.
OCT. 	 South	Africa	program	convenes	a	group	of	grantees	and	
co-funders	to	plan	for	the	end	of	Atlantic’s	support. The 
“scenario planning” session enlists gay and lesbian hu-
man-rights groups throughout South Africa, along with 
other international funders and technical-assistance 
providers, to explore ways of working together, raising 
new funds, sustaining their organizations, and strength-
ening their movement, in light of Atlantic’s intent to 
conclude its grantmaking in this area as early as 2011. 
Options include creation of a community foundation, 
with seed funding from Atlantic and other major donors, 
to support gay and lesbian rights in South Africa.
